HOA Fees: A BAPCPA Death-Trap by Stitzer, Brandt H.
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 70 | Issue 2 Article 18
Spring 3-1-2013
HOA Fees: A BAPCPA Death-Trap
Brandt H. Stitzer
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation




HOA Fees: A BAPCPA Death-Trap 
Brandt H. Stitzer* 
Table of Contents 
 I. Introduction ................................................................... 1396 
 II. Assessments Are Prepetition Debts Under § 101 ......... 1400 
  A. Declaration as a Prepetition Contract .................... 1403 
  B. Declaration as an Executory Contract .................... 1406 
  C. Declaration as a Property Interest ......................... 1407 
  D. Right to Payment Determined by State Cause  
   of Action ................................................................... 1411 
  E. Conclusion on Claim ................................................ 1412 
 III. Statutory Exemption from Discharge ........................... 1414 
  A. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 .............................. 1414 
  B. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
   Protection Act of 2005 ............................................. 1417 
  C. BAPCPA § 523(a)(16)’s Death-Trap ........................ 1418 
   1. BAPCPA’s Faulty Assumptions and  
    Disincentive to Foreclose ................................... 1419 
    a. The Mortgage Crisis ..................................... 1419 
    b. Inability to Force Foreclosure ...................... 1422 
   2. Section 523(a)(16)’s Ineffectiveness in  
    Protecting Associations ..................................... 1426 
   3. Section 523(a)(16)’s Overinclusiveness ............. 1429 
 IV. Possible Solutions .......................................................... 1430 
  A. Proposal to Amend § 523(a)(16) .............................. 1431 
  B. Judicial Solutions .................................................... 1434 
   1. Section 105 Equitable Powers ........................... 1434 
                                                                                                     
 * Candidate for J.D., Washington and Lee University School of Law, May 
2013. I would like to thank Professor Margaret Howard for her guidance, 
encouragement, and helpful comments and criticism to strengthen this Note. I 
would also like to thank mentor Keith A. Pagano for pointing me toward this 
topic. Lastly, thank you to the members of the Washington and Lee Law Review 
for all their assistance. 
1396 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395 (2013) 
   2. Violation of Automatic Stay or Discharge  
    Injunction by Refusing to Foreclose or  
    Release ............................................................... 1436 
 V. Conclusion ...................................................................... 1440 
I. Introduction 
The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2005 (BAPCPA)’s1 codified protections to common-interest 
associations create a death-trap for honest bankruptcy debtors 
trying to achieve a fresh start. Because it is impossible to compel 
foreclosure and because the current economic and legislative 
environment creates strong incentives not to foreclose, 
association fees may accrue indefinitely, a problem the debtor is 
powerless to correct. 
Associations, including homeowner associations (HOAs) and 
condominium associations, are real estate developments or 
neighborhoods with individually owned lots or units “burdened by 
a servitude that imposes [a nonavoidable] obligation . . . to pay 
dues or assessments.”2 Mandatory member assessments provide a 
means for members to share the cost of otherwise cost-prohibitive 
amenities.3 Associations are creatures of state law and each state 
has an enabling statute that sanctions the formation of the 
association upon meeting certain requirements.4 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 11 U.S.C.) [hereinafter BAPCPA]. 
 2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.8 (2000) [hereinafter 
SERVITUDES]. There are approximately 314,000 such communities accounting for 
62.3 million residents in the United States. Industry Data National Statistics, 
CMTY. ASS’NS INST., http://www.caionline.org/info/research/Pages/default.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
Approximately 52–55% of this total is contributable to HOAs, while 38–42% is 
contributable to condominiums. Id. 
 3. See WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION 
PRACTICE: COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW § 1.05 (3d ed. 2001) (noting that 
associations use mandatory assessments to maintain common areas, allowing 
members to spread costs among each other). 
 4. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2346 (West 2011) (providing the license 
requirements for an association under Virginia law); see also DAVID CLURMAN & 
EDNA L. HEBARD, CONDOMINIUMS AND COOPERATIVES 12–13 (1970) (describing 
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Contrary to the traditional use of bankruptcy, many debtors 
are choosing to surrender5 their homes in bankruptcy because of 
decreases in home values6 and equity.7 The depressed real estate 
market combined with other disincentives to foreclose means 
lenders are not rushing to foreclose on delinquent borrowers.8 
While the Bankruptcy Code (Code) provides debtors with an 
option to surrender property, it does not compel foreclosure sale 
by a lender.9 Absent foreclosure, debtors still own their homes, 
                                                                                                     
states’ common-interest association enabling statutes as the “legislative 
sanction on the effectiveness of [the declaration] among participating owners, 
and between the latter and outsiders”). 
 5. See 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(2)(A) (2010) (providing Chapter 7 debtors with 
an option to surrender encumbered property); id. § 1325(a)(5)(C) (providing 
Chapter 13 debtors with a similar option). The difference between a Chapter 7 
and a Chapter 13 bankruptcy is basic. Chapter 7 equates to a liquidation in 
which the trustee sells a debtor’s nonexempt property and pays creditors in a 
proscribed priority with the proceeds. See DAVID EPSTEIN ET AL., BANKRUPTCY 
§ 1-8 (1993). Chapter 13 equates to a reorganization of debt in which the trustee 
pays creditors through a three-to-five-year repayment plan. See id. 
 6. See Historical Data Exhibit 9. Existing Home Prices: 1969–Present, U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., http://www.huduser.org/portal/periodicals/ 
ushmc/fall11/USHMC_3q11_historical.pdf (reporting a median inflation-
adjusted home sales price of $221,900 in 2006, $198,100 in 2008, and $172,900 
in 2010). 
 7. See Press Release, CoreLogic, Q2 2010 Negative Equity (Aug. 26, 2010), 
http://www.corelogic.com/about-us/news/asset_upload_file301_4022.pdf (noting 
“that 11 million, or 23 percent, of all residential properties with mortgages were 
in negative equity”); see also Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (In re Pigg), 
453 B.R. 728, 733 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011) (noting that Congress never 
contemplated a situation in which so many borrowers with negative equity 
would be filing bankruptcy and surrendering their properties). The number of 
debtors surrendering their homes is also contributable to the increases in the 
number of bankruptcy filings. See Table 770. Bankruptcy Petitions Filed and 
Pending by Type and Chapter: 1990 to 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/11s0771.pdf (showing an 
increase from 2007 Chapter 7 and 13 filings of 435,064 and 291,560, 
respectively, to 870,266 and 379,939 in 2009, respectively). 
 8. See In re Pigg, 453 B.R. at 733 (“With the real estate collapse, lenders, 
who otherwise have the right to do so, are choosing not to foreclose on their 
collateral leaving homeowners in limbo.”); Les Christie, Foreclosure Free Ride: 3 
Years, No Payments, CNNMONEY (Jan. 1, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/ 
2011/12/28/real_estate/foreclosure/index.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) 
(“Nationwide, the average time it takes to process a foreclosure—from the first 
missed payment to the final foreclosure auction—has climbed to 674 days from 
253 days just four years ago. . . .”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 9. See Arsenault v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Arsenault), 456 
1398 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395 (2013) 
even after bankruptcy discharge.10 The result is that a borrower-
debtor’s fresh start becomes solely dependent on their lender’s 
decision to foreclose. 
As a primary goal of bankruptcy, a fresh start is premised on 
the philosophy that only when a person is relieved of his past 
financial burdens can that person reenter society as a productive 
citizen.11 Bankruptcy does not, however, ensure a fresh start with 
respect to every debt owed by the debtor. Section 52312 provides 
an exhaustive list of debts that survive discharge.13 While cutting 
to the heart of a debtor’s fresh start, these exceptions to discharge 
are “the product of countervailing policy considerations in which 
the scales of justice tip in favor of certain creditors.”14 Some of the 
exceptions are based on the defenseless nature of the creditor or 
the egregious nature of the debtor’s debt.15  
                                                                                                     
B.R. 627, 630 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2011) (“[T]he act of [surrendering] does not 
obligate [lender] to transfer title out of Debtors’ names.”); see also In re Pigg, 453 
B.R. at 732 (“Nothing in the law can require [a] Bank to foreclose.”). 
 10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 4.1 (1997) 
[hereinafter MORTGAGES] (noting that the borrower still owns the home up until 
the time of foreclosure sale); see also DAVID A. SCHMUDDE, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO 
MORTGAGES AND LIENS § 5.02(b)(c) (2004) (explaining that only a foreclosure sale 
ends debtor’s interest in the property). 
 11. See Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (noting that the 
purpose of bankruptcy is to give “the honest but unfortunate debtor . . . a new 
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the 
pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt”). 
 12. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2010). 
 13. See id. (providing a list of claims that are excluded from discharge).  
 14. George H. Singer, Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code: The 
Fundamentals of Nondischargeability in Consumer Bankruptcy, 71 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 325, 326 (1997). These countervailing policy goals include the need to 
resolve “the competing claims of multiple creditors,” and to free “debtor[s] from 
[their] financial past.” CHARLES J. TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 1.1 (2d ed. 
2009). These goals are inherently in conflict. 
 15. See § 523(a)(5), (15) (protecting claims by former spouses and children 
of the debtor); § 523(2), (4), (6), (9), (11), (13) (protecting claims by victims of 
fraud, embezzlement, willful and malicious injury, or drunk driving, and 
recipients of restitution orders, fines, or penalties); see also KAREN GROSS, 
FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS 27–28 (1997) (describing § 523 as “bankruptcy’s 
gatekeeper” keeping debtors’ “bad debts from partaking in the system’s 
benefits”); Margaret Howard, A Theory of Discharge in Consumer Bankruptcy, 
48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1047, 1050–58 (1987) (noting the concern for dishonest debtors 
taking advantage of the system and the additional protection required by 
certain creditors). 
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In 1994, associations made the § 523 list with the enactment 
of § 523(a)(16),16 which excluded future assessments, arising after 
bankruptcy petition, from discharge if the debtor continued to 
reside on the property or rented it out.17 Associations were the 
victims of freeriding members—members that file bankruptcy to 
discharge future assessments, but continue to reside in their 
properties, pay their mortgages, and assume the benefits 
procured by the association without paying any assessments.18 
These freeriders exemplify the dishonest, bad faith debtors that 
§ 523 seeks to protect against. 
In 2005, BAPCPA expanded protection to associations by 
completely excluding future assessments from discharge, 
regardless of the debtors’ use of the property after filing.19 Thus, 
between surrendering their homes in bankruptcy and the lenders’ 
eventual foreclosure sale, member-debtors continue to be liable 
for accumulating association dues postdischarge, continue to face 
collection efforts from their associations for nondischarged 
postpetition assessments, and must choose between spending 
disposable income on abandoned property or risking the inability 
to rebuild their credit. This Note will argue that associations 
were adequately protected from freeriders with the 1994 version 
of § 523(a)(16). BAPCPA’s broadened protection is overinclusive, 
engulfing honest debtors that cannot transfer their property due 
to a lack of equity and lender delay. Moreover, a modified 
standard, closer to that of the 1994 version of § 523(a)(16), 
applied to both Chapter 7 and 13 debtors,20 would better serve 
                                                                                                     
 16. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 309, 108 
Stat. 4106, 4137 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) (1994)) (current 
version at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) (2010)) [hereinafter Reform Act]. 
 17. See id. 
 18. See Marvin J. Nodiff & Benjamin S. Gage, Post-petition Assessments: 
“Fresh Start” or “Head Start,” 50 J. MO. B. 237, 238–39 (1994) (describing the 
“head start,” rather than “fresh start,” that would be given to members who 
were able to assume the benefits of the associations at the expense of other 
members). 
 19. See BAPCPA § 412 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) 
(2005)) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) (2010)). 
 20. Currently, § 523(a)(16) is only applicable in Chapter 7 cases. See 11 
U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2) (2005) (omitting § 523(a)(16)’s application to Chapter 13 
discharge). 
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the goals of the Code. Any additional protection required by 
associations is better accomplished through contract or state law. 
This Note is structured as follows. Part II will consider 
whether accumulating assessments, coming due after filing, are 
dischargeable debts but for the application of § 523. This is 
included for two reasons. First, the determination remains 
relevant in Chapter 13 cases in which § 523(a)(16) does not apply. 
Second, the determination is relevant as to the congressional 
purpose of § 523(a)(16). If future assessments are 
nondischargeable, § 523(a)(16) is superfluous, excluding from 
discharge something that is already nondischargeable. If 
assessments are dischargeable, then the intended purpose of the 
section can be compared to its unintended results. In addition to 
providing a brief history of § 523(a)(16), Part III will critique the 
unintended results of the Section and determine if a death-trap 
has been created. Part IV proposes a legislative solution and 
provides two judicial solutions. Part V will conclude. 
II. Assessments Are Prepetition Debts Under § 101 
Assessments represent the sole source of income available to 
associations to cover their expenditures.21 They are established at 
the beginning of each year and payable by the record member as 
of the due date, with membership being mandatory.22 The 
obligation to pay assessments is set out in the declaration, which 
is a recorded document “binding . . . every person who becomes a 
                                                                                                     
 21. See WAYNE S. HYATT & PHILIP S. DOWNER, CONDOMINIUM AND 
HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATION LITIGATION § 6.1 (1987) (listing other common names 
for assessments such as “maintenance fees” and “association dues”). 
Approximately $40 billion was collected in assessments in 2010. CMTY. ASS’NS 
INST., supra note 2. 
 22. See WARREN FREEDMAN & JONATHAN B. ALTER, THE LAW OF CONDOMINIA 
AND PROPERTY OWNERS’ ASSOCIATIONS 81–84 (1992) (“Annual assessments will 
be established prior to the beginning of each fiscal year and will be payable on a 
monthly basis.”).  
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property owner in the project.”23 The obligation to pay 
assessments ends only when the record owner changes.24 
Chapter 7 and 13 discharges only relieve debtors of 
prepetition debts—those that arise “before the commencement of 
the case.”25 For purposes of this Part, it must be determined 
whether the obligation to pay future assessments, which arise 
from the declaration, is a prepetition debt.26 This is important for 
two reasons: First, § 523(a)(16), exempting assessments from 
discharge, applies only to Chapter 7 discharge, so the 
determination of whether the claim for future assessments arises 
“before [or after] the commencement of the case” remains 
relevant in Chapter 13 cases.27 Second, the determination may 
shed light on Congress’s intentions when enacting § 523(a)(16). If 
assessments coming due after a debtor’s filing are not 
dischargeable prepetition debts, § 523(a)(16) is superfluous, 
excluding from discharge something that is already excluded. 
Alternatively, Congress may have intended the Section to provide 
interpretive guidance on the dischargeability of accumulating 
assessments. If assessments coming due after a debtor’s filing are 
dischargeable prepetition debts, then the policy considerations 
behind § 523(a)(16) can be compared to its results for 
overinclusiveness and unintended consequences. 
                                                                                                     
 23. HYATT, supra note 3, § 1.06(e) (“The declaration is a document 
containing the plan of development and the essentials of ownership, the method 
of operation, and the rights and responsibilities of the association and the 
owners within the association.”).  
 24. See FREEDMAN & ALTER, supra note 22, at 83 (describing “the 
assessment contract as an affirmative covenant inserted into the Declaration”); 
see also id. (noting that an “owner’s dissatisfaction or displeasure” is not a 
justifiable grounds for nonpayment). 
 25. See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2005); see also § 1328 (providing for the discharge 
of prepetition debts provided for in the plan). Similarly, the automatic stay only 
protects debtors against the attempted collection of prepetition debts during the 
time between debtor’s petition and discharge. See § 362(a)(1) (2010). 
 26. See Maple Forest Condo. Ass’n v. Spencer (In re Spencer), 457 B.R. 601, 
605 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011) (noting that the dischargeability of accruing 
assessments depends on whether they arise prepetition or postpetition); see also 
Liberty Cmty. Mgmt., Inc. v. Hall (In re Hall), 454 B.R. 230, 233 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. 2011) (noting that the application of the automatic stay to the collection of 
assessments depends on when the debt arises because the automatic stay 
“applies only to pre-petition claims”). 
 27. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2) (2005) (omitting § 523(a)(16)’s application 
from Chapter 13 discharge). 
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Section 10128 of the Code defines “debt” as a “liability on a 
claim.”29 A “claim” is defined as a “right to payment, whether or 
not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, 
fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, 
legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.”30 For the debt to be 
deemed a dischargeable prepetition claim, § 101(5) requires a 
“right to payment” to exist at the time the debtor files his petition 
for bankruptcy.31 “Right to payment” connotes a timing aspect, 
but Congress declined to define the term.32  
The Supreme Court has interpreted “right to payment” as an 
“enforceable obligation of the debtor.”33 State law is unanimously 
clear that an association-member’s enforceable obligation to pay 
assessments arises from the declaration, which creates a 
“personal obligation [against] the owner, as well as constituting a 
lien against the [property].”34 This definition presents two 
problems. First, the exact time an enforceable obligation against 
the debtor comes into existence remains unclear. Second, in 
addition to creating a personal obligation against the debtor, the 
declaration also creates a claim against the debtor’s property, and 
claims against property generally survive discharge.35  
In an attempt to solve these problems, courts have compared 
the declaration and its obligation-to-pay assessments to two 
common footings found in the Code: claims resulting from 
                                                                                                     
 28. See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2010) (providing definitions of terms). 
 29. Id. § 101(5). 
 30. Id. § 101(12). 
 31. Id. § 101(5). 
 32. See id. § 101 (declining to define “right to payment” and giving no 
direction as to when a right to payment arises). 
 33. See Penn. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 559 (1990); 
see also EPSTEIN, supra note 5, § 3-6 (“[A] claim arises under the bankruptcy law 
when the debtor acts to obligate herself (whether by law or agreement) to pay 
money (either now or later) even though the obligation was contingent.”).  
 34. HYATT & DOWNER, supra note 21, § 6.16; see also, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 718.116 (West 2011) (establishing personal liability against the owner and a 
lien against the property for unpaid assessments).  
 35. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2010) (noting that discharge “operates 
as an injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action . . . to 
collect, recover or offset any such debt as personal liability of the debtor”), with 
id. § 524(j)(1) (providing that the discharge injunction of (a)(2) does not apply to 
secured creditors with “a security interest in real property that is the principal 
residence of the debtor”).  
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prepetition contracts and claims against a debtor’s property 
interest. If the declaration is a prepetition contract, the 
association’s right to all future assessments (whether owed and 
payable before or after debtor’s bankruptcy petition) are 
dischargeable as prepetition debts.36 If the declaration is a 
property interest, the association’s right to all future assessments 
stems from ownership of the property, which cannot be 
determined until an individual assessment is due, and will be 
deemed nondischargeable as postpetition claims.37 Because of the 
peculiar nature of the declaration, however, neither category 
perfectly encompasses the declaration.  
A. Declaration as a Prepetition Contract 
In the traditional contract setting, the party’s enforceable 
obligation against the other party occurs when the contract 
becomes binding on both parties, even if the obligation is not 
performed until sometime in the future.38 The same holds true for 
assessments arising from the declaration if the declaration can be 
designated a contract that existed before the date of filing.39 The 
Seventh Circuit, in In re Rosteck,40 held that future assessments 
coming due after the debtor’s filing were dischargeable as 
                                                                                                     
 36. See In re Rosteck, 899 F.2d 694, 696 (B.A.P. 7th Cir. 1990) (finding that 
accumulating HOA assessments coming due after debtor’s filing are derived 
from a prepetition contract and are, therefore, dischargeable). 
 37. See River Place E. Hous. Corp. v. Rosenfeld (In re Rosenfeld), 23 F.3d 
833, 836 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that postpetition HOA assessments do not meet 
the definition of “debt” at the time of filing because they arise from the 
declaration—a real property interest). 
 38. See Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 
F.2d 332, 336 (3d Cir. 1984) (describing a surety contract as having “a right to 
payment, albeit contingent, upon the signing of the agreement” (citing In re 
THC Fin. Corp., 686 F.2d 799, 802–04 (9th Cir. 1982)), overruled by Grossman’s 
Inc. v. Brunt (In re Grossman’s Inc.), 607 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc); see 
also EPSTEIN, supra note 5, § 3-6 (“A contract claim can arise as soon as the 
contract is made.”). 
 39. See FREEDMAN & ALTER, supra note 22, at 82–83 (describing the 
declaration as a contract, but emphasizing that it is also a property interest). 
 40. See In re Rosteck, 899 F.2d at 697 (noting that the assessments were 
“discharged by the bankruptcy court in its discharge order”). In Rosteck, the 
debtors were sued for nonpayment of HOA fees several months after moving out 
and receiving a discharge. Id. at 695.  
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contingent future payments arising from a prepetition contract 
that “existed when [debtors] filed their bankruptcy petition.”41 
The fact that the future assessments could not be levied against 
the debtor until a future date after filing did not preclude them 
from discharge.42  
Courts that have found the declaration to be a prepetition 
contract rely on the expansive definition of “claim.”43 Congress 
intended “claim” to be construed as broadly as possible.44 It 
includes any “right to payment, whether or not such right is . . . 
contingent, matured, [or] unmatured.”45 Claims are contingent “if 
the debt is one which the debtor will be called upon to pay only 
upon the occurrence or happening of an extrinsic event.”46 The 
                                                                                                     
 41. See id. at 697 (noting that “the condominium declaration is a contract” 
and fees governed by that contract arise prepetition and are extinguished by 
bankruptcy discharge). Several other cases have determined that assessments 
arose from a prepetition contract. See In re Garcia, 168 B.R. 320, 326 (Bankr. 
E.D. Mich. 1993) (discharging accumulating assessments because they arise 
from a prepetition contract), overruled by Maple Forest Condo. Ass’n v. Spencer 
(In re Spencer), 457 B.R. 601, 609 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011); In re Elias, 98 B.R. 
332, 337 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (determining assessments dischargeable 
because they “occur postpetition but arise out of a prepetition contract”); In re 
Ryan, 100 B.R. 411, 416 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (determining that assessments 
arise from a prepetition contract (citing Household Fin. Corp. v. Hansberry, 20 
B.R. 870, 873 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982)). 
 42. See In re Rosteck, 899 F.2d 694, 696–97 (B.A.P. 7th Cir. 1990) 
(describing the date of payment as the maturing of a contingent liability); Cohen 
v. N. Park Parkside Cmty. Ass’n (In re Cohen), 122 B.R. 755, 758 (Bankr. S.D. 
Cal. 1991) (“The date on which the homeowner’s association levied its 
assessments is irrelevant for determining when the debt arose.”). 
 43. See In re Rosteck, 899 F.2d at 696–97 (noting that assessments coming 
due after filing satisfy the “broad definitions of claim and debt”); In re Pratola, 
152 B.R. 874, 877 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1993) (recognizing that under the broad 
definition of “claim,” “the debtor clearly had a debt for future condominium 
common expense assessments when she filed her bankruptcy petition”); In re 
Elias, 98 B.R. at 335 (stressing the broad definition of “debt” with legislative 
history). 
 44. See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 22 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5787, 5808 (“By this broadest possible definition . . . the bill contemplates that 
all legal obligations of the debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be 
able to be dealt with in the Bankruptcy case.”); see also Johnson v. Home State 
Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 83 (1991) (“Congress intended by [§ 101’s] language to adopt 
the broadest available definition of ‘claim.’” (citations omitted)). 
 45. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2010). 
 46. All Media Props., Inc. v. Best (In re All Media Props., Inc.), 5 B.R. 126, 
133 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980), aff’d, 646 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam); see 
also In re Dill, 30 B.R. 546, 549 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1983) (noting that contingent 
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Rosteck court characterized accruing association assessments as 
contingent claims because debtors “agreed to make payments, but 
whether and how much they actually had to pay depended on 
future uncertain events,” such as continued ownership and the 
association continuing to levy assessments.47 Similarly, accruing 
assessments have been defined as “the periodic maturing of [the 
association]’s prepetition claim.”48 
The theory that assessments coming due after a debtor’s 
filing are dischargeable because the declaration is a prepetition 
contract that becomes binding against the debtor upon taking 
ownership of the property has one serious flaw.49 It is not clear 
whether a declaration is even a contract—it is not signed by the 
parties;50 the declaration is missing other necessary components 
of a contract, including consideration and meeting of the minds;51 
the declaration is commonly described as a servitude and, 
therefore, outside the scope of contract law.52  
                                                                                                     
claims are those coming due on the occurrence of a future event). 
 47. In re Rosteck, 899 F.2d at 696–97. But see In re Spencer, 457 B.R. 601, 
614 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011) (describing “[t]he contingency upon which the 
bankruptcy courts in the Rosteck line of cases relied [a]s merely illusory 
[because] it remains within the power of a debtor to prevent the contingency.”); 
Beeter v. Tri-City Prop. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. (In re Beeter), 173 B.R. 108, 123 
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994) (“There comes a point when a potential future liability 
becomes so speculative that it cannot justifiably be deemed a ‘claim’ for 
bankruptcy purposes.”). Some courts require the contingency of “the uncertain 
future event . . . occur with some probability beyond the control of the debtor,” 
unlike the debtor’s ability to sell the property. In re Spencer, 457 B.R. at 613. 
Part III will argue that, given the current condition of the housing market, it 
may be that the debtors’ ability to unilaterally relinquish title to an underwater 
property is illusory. 
 48. In re Wasp, 137 B.R. 71, 72 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992) (“Any Association 
fees coming due after Debtors’ filing of their bankruptcy petition were no more 
than unmatured portions of their original liability to the Association.”); In re 
Turner, 101 B.R. 751, 754 (Bankr. D. Utah 1989), superseded by In re Colon, 465 
B.R. 657 (Bankr. D. Utah 2011); In re Montoya, 95 B.R. 511, 513 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ohio 1988) (discharging accruing assessments as unmatured claims). 
 49. See FREEDMAN & ALTER, supra note 22, at 82 (noting that the obligation 
to pay assessments is binding upon ownership). 
 50. See id. at 61 (describing the declaration as a document that is filed with 
the locality by the developer). 
 51. See In re Beeter, 173 B.R. at 115 (noting that neither consideration nor 
meeting of the minds is present as required by contract law). 
 52. See infra note 63 and accompanying text (describing declarations and 
their accompanying assessments as based in real property law). 
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B. Declaration as an Executory Contract 
A specific type of prepetition contract is an executory 
contract. If the declaration is deemed an executory contract, “it 
can be rejected, and any liability for future assessments would be 
relegated to the status of a prepetition claim, easily discharged in 
the bankruptcy process.”53 An executory contract is “a contract 
under which the obligation of both the [debtor] and the other 
party to the contract are so far unperformed that failure of either 
to complete performance would constitute a material breach 
excusing performance by the other.”54 Under this definition, the 
declaration may qualify: Associations have an ongoing obligation 
to provide services, while debtors have an ongoing obligation to 
pay assessments, and the failure of either to perform would be a 
material breach of the declaration.55 For the reasons below, this 
theory has been widely dismissed.56  
The primary reason this theory has been rejected is the same 
reason the Rosteck line is criticized—the declaration cannot be 
rejected as an executory contract because it is not a contract in 
the first place.57 Rather, it is a servitude representing a real 
property interest.58 Allowing the debtor to reject the declaration 
unilaterally would allow him to give up the burden of having to 
                                                                                                     
 53. Beeter v. Tri-City Prop. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. (In re Beeter), 173 B.R. 108, 
113–14 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994). 
 54. Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. 
L. REV. 439, 460 (1973). 
 55. See In re Miller, 125 B.R. 441, 443 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) (describing 
the declaration as an executory contract). But see FREEDMAN & ALTER, supra 
note 22, at 82 (“[T]he obligation of the unit owner to pay assessments is 
independent of the association’s obligation to maintain the premises.”). 
 56. See In re Rivera, 256 B.R. 828, 834 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000) 
(consolidating cases and providing three reasons a declaration is not an 
executory contract); In re Garcia, 168 B.R. 320, 324 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993) 
(“[R]eject[ing] the concept that condominium fees in this case represent an 
executory contract.”), overruled by Maple Forest Condo. Ass’n v. Spencer (In re 
Spencer), 457 B.R. 601, 609 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011); In re Case, 91 B.R. 102, 
103–04 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) (rejecting the notion that the declaration 
constituted an executory contract). 
 57. See In re Case, 91 B.R. at 104 (rejecting the executory contract theory 
because the “declaration creates and defines the Debtors’ interests in the real 
property” rather than in contract). 
 58. See infra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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pay, but continue to accept the benefits of ownership.59 Even if 
the court establishes that an executory contract exists, 11 U.S.C. 
§ 36560 gives only the trustee and not the debtor the power to 
reject it.61 The executory contract definition requires a material 
breach by a party to the contract, so trustee rejection “would not 
constitute a breach relieving the debtor of the debtor’s obligation 
to perform” because the trustee is not a party to the contract.62 
Accordingly, the declaration cannot be considered an executory 
contract for the purpose of determining if assessments are 
prepetition debts. 
C. Declaration as a Property Interest 
The problem with the contract theories noted in subparts A 
and B is that the declaration is a covenant that runs with the 
land, giving the association a real property interest in the 
debtor’s property.63 The association’s interest in its members’ 
                                                                                                     
 59. See Beeter v. Tri-City Prop. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. (In re Beeter), 173 B.R. 
108, 115 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994) (“In order for a debtor to ‘reject’ a 
declaration . . . the debtor would also have to somehow ‘part’ with the benefits of 
the putative ‘executory contract,’ [which is] not possible.”); see also In re Rivera, 
256 B.R. at 834 (“[D]ebtor cannot simultaneously accept the benefits and reject 
the burdens of an executory contract. . . .” (citing In re Beeter, 173 B.R. at 113–
16)). But see In re Miller, 125 B.R. at 443 (allowing debtor to reject his executory 
contract). 
 60. See 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2005) (providing the Code’s treatment of executory 
contracts but giving no definition for one). 
 61. See id. (giving the trustee the power to “assume or reject any executory 
contract”); see also Eastover Bank for Sav. v. Sowashee Venture (In re Austin 
Dev. Co.), 19 F.3d 1077, 1081 (5th Cir. 1994) (distinguishing “rejection” from 
“termination” of the contract); In re Raymond, 129 B.R. 354, 358 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1991) (analogizing trustee’s rejection of a declaration to a trustee’s 
rejection of a lease).  
 62. See In re Rivera, 256 B.R. 828, 834 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000); see also 
Behrens v. Woodhaven Ass’n, 87 B.R. 971, 974 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (“[The 
association] does not seek to enforce this contract against the trustee or the 
estate. It seeks to enforce the contract against the Debtors personally. The 
Debtors could not assume or reject that contract under 11 U.S.C. § 365.”). 
 63. See River Place E. Hous. Corp. v. Rosenfeld (In re Rosenfeld), 23 F.3d 
833, 833 (4th Cir. 1994) (“The key to distinguishing a right to payment that is or 
is not subject to . . . discharge is simply whether the right to payment is based 
on a property interest or something else.”); see also FREEDMAN & ALTER, supra 
note 22, at 62, 82 (describing declarations as “servitudes running with the land,” 
creating a real property interest). The affirmative covenant “for the payment of 
1408 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395 (2013) 
properties is protected by the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution.64 As a property interest, there are two reasons to 
call into question whether the association’s right to payment 
constitutes a prepetition debt. First, as a property interest, the 
enforceable obligation against the debtor for assessments arises 
through the continued ownership of the property after filing—a 
postpetition act.65 Second, secured property interests are 
protected under the Code and generally survive discharge.66 
The distinction between secured claims against debtors’ real 
property and claims against debtors individually, and the ability 
to separate them, is crucial to this theory. The Supreme Court in 
Johnson v. Home State Bank67 used the “enforceable obligation” 
interpretation of “right to payment” to distinguish the lender’s 
dischargeable claim against the debtor (the in personam liability) 
from the nondischargeable claim against the property (the in rem 
liability).68 Upon the debtor’s discharge, the lender could not seek 
                                                                                                     
money” is a real property interest if it is deemed to run with the land. See 
SERVITUDES, supra note 2, § 1.3; see also id. cmt. e (“[It is] a servitude if either 
the benefit or the burden runs with the land.”). While states differ in their 
requirements for a covenant to run with the land, laws uniformly provide that 
an association’s declaration for assessments runs with the land. See HYATT & 
DOWNER, supra note 21, § 6.3 (“[I]f carefully drafted, the affirmative covenant to 
pay assessments to the association runs with the land and is binding on all 
successors-in-title.”). The law is moving towards reliance on the intention of the 
parties rather than formalities in determining whether a covenant runs with 
the land. See SERVITUDES, supra note 2, § 2.4 cmt. 1 (noting that the majority of 
states have done away with horizontal privity as a requirement for a covenant 
to run with the land). 
 64. See, e.g., In re Rivera, 256 B.R. at 833–34 (“A homeowners’ association’s 
right to impose postpetition assessments pursuant to a recorded Declaration of 
Covenants and Restrictions is within the scope of the traditional property 
interests protected by the Fifth Amendment.”). 
 65. See Maple Forest Condo. Ass’n v. Spencer (In re Spencer), 457 B.R. 601, 
607 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011) (noting that the obligation to pay assessments 
comes from “the act of retaining ownership of the property”). 
 66. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2010) (declining to apply the discharge to 
claims against debtor’s property). 
 67. See Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 83 (1991) (holding that 
“[a] surviving mortgage interest [of a Chapter 7 discharge] corresponds to an 
‘enforceable obligation’ of the debtor”). 
 68. See id. at 85–86 (noting that such interpretation of “claim” was 
consistent with the Code’s structure); see also Cen-Pen Corp. v. Hanson, 58 F.3d 
89, 92 (4th Cir. 1995) (noting that discharge has “no effect on an in rem claim 
against the debtor’s property”).  
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payment from the debtor.69 Rather, it would be limited to 
foreclosing and satisfying its claim with the collateral sale 
proceeds.70 
Like a mortgage, the declaration creates a nondischargeable 
lien against the debtor’s property that enables the “creditor to 
seek satisfaction from a particular piece of property.”71 Unlike a 
mortgage, in which “the in personam liability on a mortgage is a 
matter of contract,” the covenant to pay assessments “is an 
integral part of the property which the debtor acquired when the 
debtor [took] title to the property.”72 Thus, the association’s claim 
against the debtor for future assessments cannot be separated 
from its interest in the debtor’s property.73 The result is a debtor’s 
personal obligation to pay assessments, like any other servitude 
running with the land, which cannot be discharged as a claim 
against the debtor individually.74  
                                                                                                     
 69. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1) (2010) (precluding creditors from attempting 
to collect debts against the debtor after discharge). 
 70. See Johnson, 501 U.S. at 86. 
 71. FREEDMAN & ALTER, supra note 22, at 83. 
 72. In re Rivera, 256 B.R. 828, 833–34 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000); see also 
Liberty Cmty. Mgmt., Inc. v. Hall (In re Hall), 454 B.R. 230, 241 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. 2011) (distinguishing a covenant to pay assessments from a mortgage). The 
Hall court distinguished a covenant to pay HOA assessments from a mortgage 
by noting that mortgages are based on a debt while assessments are based on a 
covenant. See id. Further, the assessments could not be liquidated upon default 
like a mortgage, and the duty to pay assessments ended upon terminating 
ownership, whereas a borrower is obligated to pay his mortgage postownership 
unless released. See id. 
 73. See Maple Forest Condo. Ass’n v. Spencer (In re Spencer), 457 B.R. 601, 
607 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011) (“The obligations [to pay future assessments] affix 
and inhere in the property itself.”). But see In re Wasp, 137 B.R. 71, 73 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 1992) (distinguishing the discharged personal obligation to pay 
assessments from the claim the association has against the property for unpaid 
assessments). 
 74. See Beeter v. Tri-City Prop. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. (In re Beeter), 173 B.R. 
108, 118 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994) (comparing the obligation to pay assessments 
to “prohibitions on making changes to the exterior of the unit,” which are not 
considered dischargeable claims); SERVITUDES, supra note 2, § 7.9 (“No 
servitude . . . is extinguishable in a bankruptcy proceeding, unless otherwise 
required by statute.”). But see Cohen v. N. Park Parkside Cmty. Ass’n (In re 
Cohen), 122 B.R. 755, 758 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1991) (discharging accruing 
assessments arising from a covenant running with the land because the signing 
of the covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) took place before filing). 
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This concept—that the claim for assessments arises from a 
nondischargeable property interest with the personal obligation 
to pay assessments inextricably intertwined—is the position held 
by a strong majority of courts.75 As a property interest, it must 
survive discharge.76 The reason is simple; a debtor should not, 
upon discharge, be entitled to more property rights than he had 
before the bankruptcy.77  
If a debtor entered a prepetition contract to pay his neighbor 
$100 to cut his grass for each of the next twelve months, the 
debtor, upon meeting certain criteria, could avoid future 
payments by filing bankruptcy because the obligation arose 
before filing, even if payment was secured by debtor’s property. If, 
however, the debtor and his neighbor each gave the other a 
property interest—such as an equitable servitude—in the other’s 
land in exchange for lawn care, it could not be discharged because 
the “prepetition ownership or covenanting ownership” does not 
create the obligation to pay assessments;78 rather, the 
postpetition “act of retaining ownership” would alone create the 
neighbor’s right to payment.79 
                                                                                                     
 75. See In re Beeter, 173 B.R. at 122 (“[E]ach new month’s ownership 
carries with it a new personal liability, arising out of the equitable servitude 
that burdens that ownership.”). 
 76. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1) (2010) (declining to include secured 
claims against property within the scope of discharge); see also TABB, supra note 
14, § 10.1 (noting that claims against “the debtor’s property are not 
discharged”). 
 77. See Cen-Pen Corp. v. Hanson, 58 F.3d 89, 93 (4th Cir. 1995) (“The 
simple expedient of passing their residence through the bankruptcy estate could 
not vest in the [debtors] a greater interest in the residence than they enjoyed 
prior to filing. . . .” (citing Second Nat’l Bank of Saginaw v. Honaker (In re 
Honaker), 4 B.R. 415, 417 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1980)). If association members 
could rid themselves of the obligation to pay assessments in the future by 
simply filing bankruptcy, the property rights of all other members would be 
substantially burdened. 
 78. In re Spencer, 457 B.R. at 607; In re Beeter, 173 B.R. at 118 (“Simply 
locating the source of the obligation as the Declaration, and noting that the 
property was purchased prior to filing the petition does not end the inquiry, for 
the nature and duration of the obligation and its attachment to an interest in 
property necessarily complicates the issue.”). 
 79. Maple Forest Condo. Ass’n v. Spencer (In re Spencer), 457 B.R. 601, 607 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011); see also In re Beeter, 173 B.R. at 122 (“[T]he liability 
does not arise ‘as of’ the day the debtor acquires the property, but ‘as a result of’ 
the fact that, on the first of any given month, the debtor is the current owner of 
the property.”). 
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D. Right to Payment Determined by State Cause of Action 
In addition to defining the declaration as a prepetition 
contract or property interest to determine when the claim for 
assessments arises, some courts have relied on when the 
association could sue the debtor for unpaid assessments. In 
Maple Forest Condominium Ass’n v. Spencer,80 the court 
determined the association’s right to future assessments was a 
postpetition debt because no state-law cause of action for the 
assessments existed on the date of filing.81 Similarly, the court in 
Liberty Community Management, Inc. v. Hall82 found no right to 
payment existed because the association had no “right to enforce 
payment” at the time of filing.83 In effect, because an action for 
missed payments cannot be brought until they are in fact missed, 
there is no right to payment at the time of filing, rendering the 
claim postpetition and nondischargeable.84 
The problem with the analysis used by the Hall and Spencer 
courts is that it replicates the test used in Avellino & Bienes v. M. 
                                                                                                     
 80. See In re Spencer, 457 B.R. at 616 (determining that an association’s 
claim for unpaid assessments coming due after debtor’s filing is not discharged). 
In Spencer, the debtor surrendered his condominium around the date of filing 
his petition, but the lender took no action, even after the automatic stay was 
lifted. See id. at 604 (noting that the lender could foreclose on the property but 
had not done so). The association filed a complaint “seeking declaratory 
judgment that postpetition assessments were not discharged by the bankruptcy 
proceedings.” Id. at 605. 
 81. See id. at 606 (noting that because the association had no lawful right 
to future assessments on the date of filing, no right to payment existed).  
 82. See Liberty Cmty. Mgmt., Inc. v. Hall (In re Hall), 454 B.R. 230, 241 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011) (determining assessments arise postpetition because a 
“creditor’s right to payment simply does not exist at the time of a debtor’s 
bankruptcy filing”). In Hall, the condominium association filed a proof of claim 
for unpaid arrears three years after the petition was filed, and debtor sought a 
court order finding the association in violation of the automatic stay. See id. at 
232. The court described the obligation to pay HOA assessments as “an ongoing 
service contract” that required payment from the owner at the time payment 
was due. Id. at 234. 
 83. Id. at 234 (“For instance, [the association] would not be able to assess a 
lien or sue for the unpaid post-petition assessments because the assessments do 
not even exist.”). 
 84. See In re Spencer, 457 B.R. at 606 (determining that the association 
could not have brought any action for postpetition assessments as of the day of 
petition).  
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Frenville Co.,85 a Third Circuit case that has received much 
criticism for its reliance on state law to determine when a claim 
arises.86 If dischargeable claims exist only if the creditor could 
have sued on the date of filing, too many otherwise-dischargeable 
claims would be precluded from discharge, which is contrary to 
Congress’s broad definition of “claim.”87 Accordingly, this 
approach to determine when assessments arise, like the 
executory contract approach, is inappropriate. 
E. Conclusion on Claim 
Because the use of an executory contract and Frenville 
analysis are inappropriate to determine if accruing assessments 
are prepetition debts, the determination turns on the prepetition 
contract–property interest distinction. If accumulating 
assessments cannot be cabined within § 101(5)’s broad definition, 
“the policies underlying the fresh start, implemented by the grant 
of the discharge in bankruptcy, would be unacceptably 
compromised” because debtors will continue to be responsible for 
accruing assessments after filing and subsequent discharge.88 
The legislative history of § 523(a)(16), discussed in Part III, cites 
                                                                                                     
 85. See Avellino & Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 
F.2d 332, 337 (3d Cir. 1984) (determining a claim arises when a state cause of 
action can be brought (citing Vanston Bondholders Prot. Comm. v. Green, 329 
U.S. 156, 161 (1946))), overruled by Grossman’s Inc. v. Brunt (In re Grossman’s 
Inc.), 607 F.3d 114 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc). In Frenville, the creditor sought 
relief from the automatic stay to include the Chapter 7 debtors “as third-party 
defendants in the New York state [indemnification] proceeding.” Id. at 334–35. 
The issue was whether a right to payment existed at filing if the cause of action 
“did not arise until after . . . filing.” Id. at 335. 
 86. See, e.g., Firearms Imp. & Exp. Corp. v. United Capital Ins. Co. (In re 
Firearms Imp. & Exp. Corp.), 131 B.R. 1009, 1015 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1991) 
(describing Frenville “as one of the most criticized and least followed precedents 
decided under the current Bankruptcy Code”); see also EPSTEIN, supra note 5, 
§ 11-3 (“Even if state law determines the existence of a claim (i.e., if a claim 
exists), it is entirely appropriate for federal bankruptcy law to determine, for 
bankruptcy purposes, when the claim arises.”). 
 87. See In re Grossman’s Inc., 607 F.3d at 121 (overturning Frenville 
because of its conflict with the Code’s broad treatment of “claim”). 
 88. In re Montoya, 95 B.R. 511, 514 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1988); see also 
Behrens v. Woodhaven Ass’n, 87 B.R. 971, 975 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988) (noting 
that to hold otherwise would “effectively gut the careful protections Congress 
afforded” debtors). 
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Rosteck, indicating Congress, in protecting associations, believed 
it was excluding from discharge an otherwise dischargeable 
prepetition contract.89 Therefore, the Section is not superfluous.  
If Congress thought it was excluding a prepetition claim from 
discharge when enacting § 523(a)(16), then accumulating 
assessments should be discharged as prepetition contracts in 
Chapter 13 cases in which § 523(a)(16) does not apply.90 
Surprisingly, courts in Chapter 13 cases continue to disagree over 
whether the declaration is a prepetition contract or a 
nondischargeable property interest.91 It seems unlikely that 
Congress meant § 523(a)(16) to serve a clarification role for two 
reasons: First, the Section includes no language about the timing 
of the debt.92 Second, it seems impractical to clarify assessments 
in Chapter 7 cases, but decline to do so in the Chapter 13 cases.93 
Accordingly, we can surmise that by purposely excluding a 
prepetition claim from discharge, Congress intended to pursue 
some kind of policy objective. 
                                                                                                     
 89. See 140 CONG. REC. 27,687 (1994) (recognizing that assessments 
accruing after discharge would otherwise be dischargeable).  
 90. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2005) (defining the scope of Chapter 13 
discharge, but declining to incorporate § 523(a)(16)); see also In re Hawk, 314 
B.R. 312, 316–17 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2004) (“By defining the parameters of when 
post-petition fees and assessments can and cannot [be] discharged, Congress 
was implicitly stating that these future assessments are claims.”). But see 
Foster v. Double R Ranch Ass’n (In re Foster), 435 B.R. 650, 659 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 
2010) (doubting that “the omission of § 1328(a) in § 523(a)(16) or vice versa 
evinces a legislative intent” that assessments be dischargeable under § 1328(a)). 
 91. Compare In re Hawk, 314 B.R. at 316 (determining that postpetition 
assessments “are a pre-petition claim because they arose upon the Debtor 
taking title to the property, which occurred pre-petition”), with In re Foster, 435 
B.R. at 662 (noting that the nondischargeability of accruing assessments is 
warranted because “debtor’s continued interest in real property”). 
 92. See CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 10.25 (1997) 
(“Nothing in the 1994 amendment of [§ 523(a)(16)] alters the time when the 
claim is deemed to arise.”). 
 93. But see Liberty Cmty. Mgmt., Inc. v. Hall (In re Hall), 454 B.R. 230, 238 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011) (“It is just as likely that Congress was implying that 
post-petition assessments are not really claims at all, and that the amendment 
was necessary to correct the mischaracterization of post-petition assessments as 
claims.”). 
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III. Statutory Exemption from Discharge 
An otherwise dischargeable claim may be excluded from 
discharge by 11 U.S.C. § 523.94 Section 523 serves as the Code’s 
“gatekeeper,” excluding claims from discharge that Congress 
deems unworthy to “partake[e] in the system’s benefits.”95 The 
exceptions to discharge represent the “policy considerations” of 
Congress as to which debts should survive discharge.96 This Part 
will first lay out the history and policy considerations behind 
§ 523(a)(16). Because we know from Part II that Congress likely 
intended future assessments to be deemed dischargeable debts, 
this Part will conclude by critiquing the policy considerations 
behind § 523(a)(16) and comparing the intended results to the 
actual. 
A. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 (1994 Reform Act)97 
included the initial version of § 523(a)(16),98 representing 
Congress’s first accorded protection to associations. The Section 
provided: 
(a) A discharge . . . does not discharge an individual debtor 
from any debt— 
. . . . 
                                                                                                     
 94. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2010) (providing an exclusionary list of excluded 
claims from Chapter 7 discharge); see also 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2005) 
(incorporating all of § 523 into a Chapter 7 discharge); id. § 1328(a) (providing 
Chapter 13 debtor with a “superdischarge” by only incorporating portions of 
§ 523 and, thus, allowing for more dischargeable claims). 
 95. GROSS, supra note 15, at 27–28; see also Howard, supra note 15, at 
1050–58 (noting the concern for dishonest debtors taking advantage of the 
bankruptcy system and the additional protection required by certain creditors). 
 96. Singer, supra note 14, at 336. But see EPSTEIN, supra note 5, § 7-24 
(noting that not “everyone would agree to those policies”). 
 97. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 
4106 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.), amended by 
BAPCPA.  
 98. See id. § 309 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) (1994)) 
(current version at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) (2010)) (excluding postpetition 
condominium and cooperative housing dues from dischargeability if certain 
requirements are met). 
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(16) for a fee or assessment that becomes due and payable 
after the order for relief to a membership association with 
respect to the debtor’s interest in a dwelling unit that has 
condominium ownership or in a share of a cooperative housing 
corporation, but only if such fee or assessment is payable for a 
period during which— 
(A) the debtor physically occupied a dwelling unit in the 
condominium or cooperative project; or 
(B) the debtor rented the dwelling unit to a tenant and 
received payments from the tenant for such period, but 
nothing in this paragraph shall except from discharge the debt 
of a debtor for a membership association fee or assessment for 
a period arising before entry of the order for relief in a pending 
or subsequent bankruptcy case.99 
The legislative history of the Section indicates that Congress 
sought to protect associations from the abuse of freeriding 
member-debtors—those discharged debtors who continued to 
inhabit their property, pay their mortgages, and receive all the 
benefits of ownership, but refused to pay their ongoing 
association fees.100 By allowing assessments to be discharged if 
the debtor no longer resided in or rented out the property, 
Congress seems to have avoided the question of whether 
accumulating assessments constitute a dischargeable prepetition 
debt, and attempted to achieve a policy goal.101 This “you stay, 
you pay” theory paralleled a pre-existing line of cases that 
discharged accumulating assessments only if debtor vacated the 
property.102 This line of cases had balanced the Code’s desire to 
                                                                                                     
 99. Id.  
 100. See 140 CONG. REC. S4526 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (statement of Sen. 
Strom Thurmond) (noting that association members “may be unfairly burdened 
by increases in their association fees if their neighbors declare bankruptcy and 
receive a discharge of the association fees which are due in the future”). 
 101. See Old Bridge Estates Cmty. Ass’n v. Lozada (In re Lozada), 214 B.R. 
558, 561 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997) (interpreting the Reform Act’s § 523(a)(16) as 
striking “an equitable balance” between courts finding that accruing 
assessments arise prepetition and those finding that the assessments arise 
postpetition), aff’d 176 F.3d 475 (E.D. Va. 1999) (per curiam).  
 102. See In re Pratola, 152 B.R. 874, 876 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1993) (holding an 
association in contempt for attempting to collect assessments after the debtor 
vacated the property), superseded by In re Mattera, 203 B.R. 565 (Bankr. D.N.J. 
1997); In re Ryan, 100 B.R. 411, 416 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) (“If . . . the debtor 
surrenders possession and tenders the ownership interest to the association 
before or upon filing a petition . . . [the] obligation to pay postpetition 
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provide debtors with a fresh start and the protection associations 
required from freeriding members who remained on the 
premises.103 
The 1994 version of § 523(a)(16) did, however, create some 
problems. It referred to condominium and cooperatives 
assessments but failed to mention homeowner associations.104 
This omission created confusion as to whether the Section applied 
to HOA assessments.105 The Section also did not apply to Chapter 
13 debtors because § 1328(a),106 defining the scope of Chapter 13 
discharge, did not include reference to § 523(a)(16).107 In Chapter 
13 cases, courts continued to disagree on whether accruing 
assessments constituted a dischargeable debt.108 The Section was 
also criticized for not affording associations enough protection 
                                                                                                     
assessments may be discharged.”); In re Montoya, 95 B.R. 511, 513 (Bankr. S.D. 
Ohio 1988) (finding accumulating assessments dischargeable because the debtor 
vacated the property upon filing). But see Beeter v. Tri-City Prop. Mgmt. Servs., 
Inc. (In re Beeter), 173 B.R. 108, 112 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1997) (describing this 
line of cases as “results-oriented” with no basis in the Code). 
 103. See In re Ryan, 100 B.R. at 416 (describing its decision as “a fair 
accommodation of the rights and needs of the association while accomplishing 
the broad goals of the Bankruptcy Code”); see also In re Pratola, 152 B.R. at 877 
(describing the Ryan rule as a “fair compromise” between debtor’s entitlement to 
a fresh start and the potential abuses by freeriding debtors). 
 104. See Reform Act § 309 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) 
(1994)) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) (2010)) (omitting homeowner 
association dues from the discharge exclusion). 
 105. Compare In re Lozada, 214 B.R. at 563 (determining that “homeowner’s 
assessments and fees do not fall within the provisions of § 523(a)(16)” because 
they were left out of the statute’s unambiguous language), with In re Rivera, 
256 B.R. 828, 832 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000) (referring to the legislative history’s 
clear intention to include homeowner association assessments). 
 106. See Reform Act § 302 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) 
(1994)) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) (2005)). 
 107. See id. (excluding § 523(a)(16) as an exception from Chapter 13 
discharge). 
 108. Compare In re Mattera, 203 B.R. 565, 567–68 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1997) 
(finding that a Chapter 13 debtor’s ongoing HOA assessments were “contingent, 
unmatured, unliquidated and unfixed debt[s]” that were dischargeable if 
provided for in the plan), with Montclair Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Reynard (In 
re Reynard), 250 B.R. 241, 244 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000) (finding HOA 
assessments assessed after filings are properly classified as postpetition rather 
than prepetition debts and are, therefore, nondischargeable even if included in 
the plan (citing River Place E. Hous. Corp. v. Rosenfeld (In re Rosenfeld), 23 
F.3d 833, 837 (4th Cir. 1994))). 
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because associations would be harmed if they could not collect 
from vacating debtors.109 
B. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005 
In 2005, Congress enacted BAPCPA in an attempt to curb 
the perceived abuse of the Code.110 The overhaul expanded 
§ 523(a)(16)’s111 exclusion of accruing assessments from discharge 
to a complete bar, regardless of whether the debtor continued to 
inhabit or rent out the property: 
(a) A discharge . . . does not discharge an individual debtor 
from any debt— 
. . . . 
(16) for a fee or assessment that becomes due and payable 
after the order for relief to a membership association with 
respect to the debtor’s interest in a unit that has condominium 
ownership, in a share of a cooperative corporation, or a lot in a 
homeowners association, for as long as the debtor or the 
trustee has a legal, equitable, or possessory ownership interest 
in such unit, such corporation, or such lot, but nothing in this 
paragraph shall except from discharge the debt of a debtor for 
a membership association fee or assessment for a period 
arising before entry of the order for relief in a pending or 
subsequent bankruptcy case.112 
                                                                                                     
 109. See Alfred Q. Ricotta, Note & Comment, Community Association and 
Bankruptcy: Why Postpetition Assessments Should Not Be Dischargeable, 15 
BANKR. DEV. J. 187, 217–20 (1998) (proposing that Congress again amend 
§ 523(a)(16) to a flat exclusion of association fees from dischargeability). 
 110. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 1 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
88, 88 (responding to “many of the factors contributing to the increase in 
consumer bankruptcy filings”). The general consensus is that the BAPCPA 
amendments were a continuation of a trend to shift the Code from a previously 
debtor-friendly Code to one giving more preference to creditors. See Donald 
Hackney, Matthew McPherson, & Daniel Friesner, Investigating the Unintended 
Consequences of the 2005 BAPCPA “Means Test” on the Bankruptcy Chapter 
Choice Decision, 4 J. ECON. BANKING & FIN. 1, 2 (2011) (“BAPCPA provides a 
thorough overhaul of the Bankruptcy Code, generally rendering the Code more 
creditor-friendly.”).  
 111. See BAPCPA § 412 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) 
(2005)) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) (2010)). 
 112. Id. 
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The amendment’s legislative history evinces an intention “to 
broaden protections accorded to community associations with 
respect to fees or assessments . . . irrespective of whether or not 
the debtor physically occupies such property.”113 Courts, in 
Chapter 7 cases, concede the Section is intended to “preempt any 
argument that postpetition fees and assessments should be 
considered prepetition obligations.”114 The Section, as amended, 
remains inapplicable to Chapter 13 cases.115 In Chapter 13 cases, 
courts continue to struggle in determining whether accumulating 
assessments constitute a dischargeable claim under § 101(5).116 
C. BAPCPA § 523(a)(16)’s Death-Trap 
Armed with the history and policy goals of § 523(a)(16), its 
effectiveness can now be critiqued. First, it must be determined if 
the Section was amended under the faulty assumption that 
vacating debtors could easily divest themselves of ownership and 
                                                                                                     
 113. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 68, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 
154. Compared to the legislative history of the 1994 creation of § 523(a)(16), the 
reasons for the 2005 expansion of § 523 seemed to not have been debated. See 
Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 728, 733 (Bankr. 
M.D. Tenn. 2011) (describing § 523(a)(16)’s expanded coverage as “the result of 
some special interest lobbying”); see also Thomas F. Waldron & Neil M. Berman, 
Principled Principles of Statutory Interpretation: A Judicial Perspective After 
Two Years of BAPCPA, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 195, 216 (2007) (“[I]t is not clear 
what helpful legislative history exists for BAPCPA.”). 
 114. In re Ames, 447 B.R. 680, 682 n.3 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011); see also In re 
Barr, 457 B.R. 733, 738 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011) (finding that § 523(a)(16) forbids 
the discharge of debtor’s accruing assessments); In re Pigg, 453 B.R. at 732 
(recognizing the “harsh” application of § 523(a)(16) to the facts). 
 115. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (excluding Chapter 13 discharge under § 1328(a) 
from its application). But see id. (incorporating § 1328(b) for Chapter 13 debtors 
seeking a hardship discharge). Courts are in consensus on the fact that 
§ 523(a)(16) does not affect Chapter 13 discharge. See, e.g., Foster v. Double R 
Ranch Ass’n (In re Foster), 435 B.R. 650, 658–59 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010) (noting 
“that § 523(a)(16) is inapplicable to the discharge under § 1328(a)”); In re 
Danastorg, 382 B.R. 585, 588 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008) (“[T]he Court finds that 
section 523(a)(16) is inapplicable to Chapter 13 cases . . . .”). 
 116. Compare In re Colon, 465 B.R. 657, 660 (Bankr. D. Utah 2011) 
(determining accumulating “HOA assessments meet the definition of ‘claim’ 
under § 101(5) and ‘claims’ can be provided for in chapter 13 plans”), with In re 
Foster, 435 B.R. at 660–61 (finding the association’s claims for assessments do 
not arise until after discharge because they arise from a covenant running with 
the land rather than a prepetition contract). 
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escape nondischargeable accruing assessments. Second, if § 523 is 
where Congress excludes debts from discharge to achieve policy 
goals, it must be determined if the policies behind § 523(a)(16) 
were achieved. Third, if § 523 is a gatekeeper, excluding bad faith 
debts from discharge, it must be determined whether the breadth 
of the statute is overinclusive, engulfing honest debtors.  
1. BAPCPA’s Faulty Assumptions and Disincentive to Foreclose 
Before critiquing the policies and goals of § 523(a)(16), it is 
important to recognize that the primary problem faced by debtors 
is foreclosure delay by lenders. Debtors, who have surrendered 
and vacated their property, continue to be burdened with 
accumulating assessments. They wait helplessly for their lenders 
to exercise their foreclosure rights, the delay of which may benefit 
the lenders.117 Section 523(a)(16) was likely amended under the 
assumption that lenders would continue to promptly foreclose on 
surrendered properties as they had done in the past, or that 
debtors would continue to have alternative ways to divest 
themselves of property. The combination of the mortgage crisis 
and the inability for debtors to divest themselves of their 
property has proven this assumption defective. 
a. The Mortgage Crisis 
Prior to BAPCPA’s enactment in 2005, home prices had been 
steadily increasing for the previous fifteen years.118 With the 
choice to foreclose and resell the collateral at a small loss or to 
just let the property sit vacant bringing in no money, lenders 
generally found it beneficial to accept the inevitable foreclosure 
cost and resell the property.119 Unfortunately, home prices fell 
                                                                                                     
 117. See In re Pigg, 453 B.R. at 735 (noting that no law requires foreclosure 
and that lenders may find it advantageous to not foreclose on underwater 
properties in the current depressed real estate market). 
 118. See Historical Data Exhibit 9. Existing Home Prices: 1969–Present, 
supra note 6 (indicating that median sales prices for existing homes of $96,400 
in 1990, $114,600 in 1995, $143,600 in 2000, and $219,600 in 2005). 
 119. See Maple Forest Condo. Ass’n v. Spencer (In re Spencer), 457 B.R. 601, 
612 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011) (“In ordinary circumstances, a creditor with a 
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substantially120 and “11 million, or 23 percent, of all residential 
propert[y owners] with mortgages [now have] negative equity.”121 
Today, on average, a lender takes 647 days to complete the 
foreclosure process and auction off the property.122 Several 
factors, resulting primarily from the mortgage crisis, may be 
causing lenders to delay the sale of foreclosed property.  
First, as delinquencies have increased,123 the number of 
foreclosures has risen substantially,124 creating a backlog of 
paperwork and slowing lenders as they attempt to complete 
foreclosures.125 Second, the oversupply of foreclosed properties 
has saturated the market, driving home prices down.126 Lenders 
                                                                                                     
senior security interest in real property will act to foreclose upon the property or 
accept a deed in lieu of foreclosure soon after the lifting of the bankruptcy 
stay.”). 
 120. See Historical Data Exhibit 9. Existing Home Prices: 1969–Present, 
supra note 6 (reporting a median inflation-adjusted existing home sales price of 
$221,900 in 2006, $198,100 in 2008, and $172,900 in 2009). “The foreclosure 
crisis, generally considered the worst since the Great Depression of the 1930s, 
began in late 2006.” James R. Hagerty, Foreclosures, Overdue Mortgages 
Increase Again: Troubles Extend Into Prime Loans Via Option ARMs, WALL ST. 
J., Sept. 6, 2008, at A3. 
 121. CoreLogic, supra note 7. These homeowners are commonly referred to 
as being “underwater” or “upside-down” in their mortgage. See David Streitfeld, 
No Help in Sight, More Homeowners Walk Away, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2010, at A1 
(describing an underwater home as a property with a mortgage valued as 
greater than the fair market value of the property).  
 122. Christie, supra note 8. In Florida and New York, the average time 
between default and actual foreclosure relieving the borrower of all ownership is 
1,027 and 906 days, respectively. Id. 
 123. See Table 1194. Delinquency Rates and Charge-Off Rates on Loans at 
Insured Commercial Banks: 1990 to 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2011/tables/11s1194.pdf (indicating an 
increase in the percentage of residential mortgages in delinquency from 1.55% 
in 2005 to 9.10% in 2009). 
 124. See Table 1193. Mortgage Originations and Delinquency Foreclosure 
Rates: 1990 to 2009, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/compendia/ 
statab/2011/tables/11s1193.pdf (indicating an increase from $1 billion worth of 
mortgages in the foreclosure process in 2005 to $4.6 billion in foreclosure in 
2009). 
 125. See Maple Forest Condo. Ass’n v. Spencer (In re Spencer), 457 B.R. 601, 
612 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011) (“The confluence of economic forces has flooded the 
market [with foreclosures] and jammed the usual flow of the foreclosure process, 
with upstream effects on bankruptcy proceedings.”). 
 126. See Nick Timiraos, Home Sales Climb But Prices Decline, WALL. ST. J., 
Nov. 22, 2011, at A4 (estimating “that there are 1.6 million single-family homes 
in some stage of default or foreclosure that will ultimately be taken back and 
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are choosing to temporarily refrain from foreclosing with the hope 
that reduced supply may allow home prices to level out or 
possibly increase.127 Third, in response to the increased rate of 
foreclosures and public outcry, legislatures and courts have 
increased the hurdles for lenders to foreclose through consumer 
protection laws and judicially mandated procedural 
requirements.128  
BAPCPA’s version of § 523(a)(16) was presumably passed 
with the assumption that home prices would continue to rise and 
lenders would find it in their best interest to foreclose.129 In the 
event a lender chooses not to promptly sell collateral, increased 
home prices would provide debtor-members with the needed 
equity to sell the property themselves and escape accruing 
assessments. If the amendment was passed on these failed 
premises, then reason exists to amend it. 
                                                                                                     
resold by banks over the next 18 months”). 
 127. See In re Spencer, 457 B.R. at 612 (“With mortgage debt frequently 
exceeding the value of the property and limited demand in the market, lenders 
have less incentive to move swiftly because they can no longer expect to obtain 
full satisfaction on their loans.”); see also Antoinette Martin, Many Foreclosures, 
Few Listings, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2011, at RE8 (noting that the number of 
homes being foreclosed upon is not keeping up with the number of foreclosed 
homes sold, creating a shadow inventory). 
 128. See generally Dodd–Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 408, 124 Stat. 
1376, 1955–2113 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) 
(providing procedural mechanisms to ensure foreclosures are performed in an 
equitable manner). Even states have joined the regulatory scheme. See, e.g., 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5 (West 2010) (preventing lenders from filing a notice of 
default with borrowers until 30 days after initial contact with the borrower or 
after satisfying the statutorily mandated “due diligence” requirements); MD. 
CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 13-301 (West 2011) (proscribing certain lender practices 
during the foreclosure process); see also, e.g., HSBC Bank USA v. Taher, 932 
N.Y.S.2d 760, 760 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2011) (“The New York State court system has 
instituted a new filing requirement in residential foreclosure cases to protect the 
integrity of the foreclosure process and prevent wrongful foreclosures.”); David 
Streitfeld, Foreclosures Slow as Document Flaws Emerge, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 
2010, at A1 (predicting foreclosure evictions to slow sharply as a result of courts 
cracking down on lawyers “accused of cutting corners in their pursuit of rapid 
home repossessions”). 
 129. See Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 728, 
733 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011) (“Congress . . . could not have foreseen the world 
and United States financial crisis that crashed Wall Street, sunk the real estate 
market, and affected, to some degree, almost every American.”). 
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b. Inability to Force Foreclosure 
In guaranteeing a fresh start, one would surmise that the 
Code would provide a mechanism to allow the debtor to eliminate 
all interest in encumbered property so as to avoid future liability 
associated with the property. No federal or state law, however, 
allows a court to compel a lender to foreclose.130 This is disturbing 
because relief from accumulating assessments now depends on a 
lender’s willingness to foreclose.  
Sections 521131 and 1325132 of the Code provide a mechanism 
for debtors to surrender encumbered property to the lender.133 By 
surrendering their properties, debtors are notifying the trustees 
and creditors that they are making the collateral available for 
foreclosure or repossession.134 Because the Code does not define 
“surrender,” its interpretation has fallen to the courts.135 Courts 
have determined that the option to surrender does not require the 
creditor “to accept possession or to foreclose or repossess” the 
surrendered property.136 Additionally, bankruptcy courts lack the 
jurisdiction to force lenders to foreclose.137 Recently, in Arsenault 
                                                                                                     
 130. See id. at 735 (“Nothing in the law can require [a lender] to foreclose.”). 
 131. See 11 U.S.C. § 521 (2010). 
 132. See id. § 1325. 
 133. See id. § 521(a)(2)(A) (providing Chapter 7 debtors with an option to 
surrender encumbered property); see also id. § 1325(a)(5)(C) (providing Chapter 
13 debtors with the same option). 
 134. See Pratt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Pratt), 462 F.3d 14, 
18–19 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting the “most sensible connotation of ‘surrender’ . . . is 
that the debtor agreed to make the collateral available to the secured creditor”); 
see also Maple Forest Condo. Ass’n v. Spencer (In re Spencer), 457 B.R. 601, 612 
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011) (“Debtor’s ‘surrender’ merely establishes that Debtor 
will not oppose the transfer of collateral.”). 
 135. See In re Service, 155 B.R. 512, 514 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1993) (noting that 
courts have taken up the role to define “surrender”). 
 136. Canning v. Beneficial Me., Inc., 462 B.R. 258, 264 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011) 
(citing In re Pratt, 462 F.3d at 19); see also Canning v. Beneficial Me., Inc. (In re 
Canning), 442 B.R. 165, 172 (Bankr. D. Me. 2011) (noting that the surrender 
option “does not force creditors to assume ownership or take possession of 
collateral”), aff’d 462 B.R. 258 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011). But see In re Spencer, 457 
B.R. at 612 (“As more mortgages go ‘under water,’ the courts are increasingly 
called upon to chart the extent of the legal effect of surrender and transfer of 
property.” (citing In re Burgueno, 451 B.R. 1, 3 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2011))).  
 137. See In re Service, 155 B.R. at 515 (“[T]he court cannot compel 
acceptance of the surrendered property . . . .”); In re Heck, No. 09-31512 TEC, 
2011 WL 133015, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Jan. 13, 2011) (recognizing the lack of 
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v. JP Morgan Chase Bank,138 the court addressed whether “the 
creditor can be compelled to take affirmative steps to accept 
surrendered collateral” in light of the recent decline in real estate 
values.139 Though recognizing the inability of debtors to achieve a 
fresh start without such a remedy, the court fell back on 
precedent.140 
Many courts have sympathized with debtors’ inability to 
compel foreclosure and receive a fresh start, but cannot reconcile 
this compassion with the Code’s inability to accommodate 
them.141 Their response is that the burden of accumulating 
assessments terminates upon property conveyance, and debtors 
can proactively divest themselves of ownership.142 This 
                                                                                                     
subject matter jurisdiction to reopen a closed case to require a lender to 
foreclose); In re White, 282 B.R. 418, 443 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2002) (finding no 
jurisdiction to compel foreclosure because “the Code does not provide for the 
court or the debtor to direct the means by which the secured creditor deals with 
the surrendered property”).  
 138. See Arsenault v. JP Morgan Chase Bank (In re Arsenault), 456 B.R. 
627, 631 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2011) (holding that despite the debtor’s inability to 
receive a fresh start, the Chapter 13 debtor could not require a secured creditor 
to take title or foreclose on surrendered property). In Arsenault, Chapter 13 
debtors surrendered and vacated their property and brought an action against 
their lender for a “violation of automatic stay” after the lender took no action on 
the property. Id. at 628. Debtors argued that the confirmation order created a 
binding contract that forced their lender to take title to the surrendered 
property. Id. at 629. The court did not agree. See id. at 629–32. 
 139. See id. at 631. 
 140. See id. at 632 (noting that without lender foreclosure, the borrower 
continues to be charged for assessments, insurance, and maintenance related to 
ownership of the property (citing In re Canning, 442 B.R. at 172)).  
 141. See Beeter v. Tri-City Prop. Mgmt. Servs., Inc. (In re Beeter), 173 B.R. 
108, 118 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994) (“[Accumulating assessments are] an incident 
of ownership, and only termination of that ownership can bring an end to the 
ongoing liability. Bankruptcy, not surprisingly, cannot solve all of life’s 
problems. This is one liability that resists bankruptcy relief.”); see also In re 
Cormier, 434 B.R. 222, 224 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010) (noting the current 
“inadequacy of existing state and federal laws to provide meaningful, 
responsible solutions” to debtors facing accumulating assessments, but 
reconciling its decision to not compel foreclosure because “judges are 
interpreters and not architects of the law”). 
 142. See River Place E. Hous. Corp. v. Rosenfeld (In re Rosenfeld), 23 F.3d 
833, 837–38 (4th Cir. 1994) (proposing that debtors use a deed in lieu of 
foreclosure to end their interest in the property); Maple Forest Condo. Ass’n v. 
Spencer (In re Spencer), 457 B.R. 601, 616 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2011) (basing its 
analysis on the “underlying assumption that [a] Debtor is capable of divesting 
ownership of the property”); In re Burgueno, 451 B.R. 1, 4 n.9 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 
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presumption, that debtors can use self-help to end accumulating 
assessments, is flawed for several reasons. 
Upon discharge, the lender’s claim against the debtor will be 
limited to in rem rights and any deficiency will be classified as a 
dischargeable, unsecured claim.143 The debtor could sell the 
property, but if the outstanding mortgage exceeds the value of the 
property, the new buyer must take title subject to the debtor’s 
mortgage.144 Rational buyers will not take title to 
overencumbered property, and a new lender will not finance the 
transaction unless title is clear. Thus, absent the use of a 
mechanism discussed below, debtors cannot just sell their 
property unless equity is present.  
Some courts have reconciled a debtor-member’s inability to 
compel foreclosure with the availability of a deed in lieu of 
foreclosure, a quitclaim deed, or a short-sale. A deed in lieu of 
foreclosure allows the borrower to turn over his equitable interest 
in the property to the lender for “full or partial satisfaction of the 
mortgage obligation.”145 A quitclaim deed allows a borrower to 
deed the property back to the lender.146 In a short-sale, the lender 
grants the borrower permission to sell the property for less than 
the balance on the mortgage with the promise of not seeking a 
deficiency.147 In normal market conditions, these foreclosure 
                                                                                                     
2011) (proposing debtor use a quitclaim deed to divest himself of the property). 
But see Canning v. Beneficial Me., Inc., 462 B.R. 258, 268 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011) 
(recognizing the debtors’ inability to divest themselves of ownership of the 
surrendered property but still finding no violation by the lender of the discharge 
injunction in its “refusal to foreclose or discharge its mortgage”). 
 143. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (2005) (providing that a claim remains 
secured to the extent it is set off by the value of debtor’s encumbered property); 
see also Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 81 (1991) (providing that in 
personam liability rather than in rem liability on a mortgage is extinguished by 
bankruptcy discharge). 
 144. See In re Spencer, 457 B.R. at 614 (“It is not necessary that Debtor be 
able to sell the property at a price sufficient to extinguish his personal liability 
on the mortgages encumbering it.”); see also SCHMUDDE, supra note 10, § 7.01 
(noting that the mortgage continues to exist until it is paid in full, released, or 
foreclosed upon by a superior lien). 
 145. MORTGAGES, supra note 10, § 8.5 cmt. b.  
 146. See In re Burgueno, 451 B.R. at 4 n.9 (defining a quitclaim deed). 
 147. See Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Perkins, No. 10AP-1022, 2011 WL 
4790766, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 2, 2011) (“The mortgage holder agrees to 
release its mortgage lien on the property in return for the proceeds from the sale 
of the property, even though the proceeds are less than the mortgage loan 
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substitutes are promising because they allow the lender to avoid 
substantial foreclosure costs, while also allowing the debtor to 
avoid accumulating assessments and other carrying costs 
associated with continued property ownership.148  
These solutions present issues for debtors with underwater 
mortgages. First, the debtor cannot force the lender to accept a 
foreclosure substitute.149 Second, because these are only 
foreclosure substitutes, they do not terminate junior liens like a 
traditional foreclosure does.150 Junior lienholders have nothing to 
gain from accepting the short-sale, and priority lenders accepting 
a deed in lieu of foreclosure or a quitclaim deed will have to 
assume any junior liens, effectively making them unavailable to 
any underwater borrowers with multiple mortgages.151 Short-
sales require the borrower to find a new buyer, which may prove 
difficult with the surplus supply of homes on the market.152 
Quitclaim deeds and deeds in lieu of foreclosure require lenders 
                                                                                                     
balance.”). Absent a prior agreement, the lender will sue the borrower for any 
deficiency resulting from the foreclosure sales price being less than the balance 
of the mortgage obligation. See MORTGAGES, supra note 10, § 8.4 cmt. a. 
 148. See SCHMUDDE, supra note 10, § 5.10 (describing the potential cost-
saving advantages of workout plans with lenders); see also Michael Powell, 
Short Sales Resisted as Foreclosures Are Revived, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010, at 
A1 (describing short-sales as “a less disruptive solution” compared to 
foreclosure); Ruth Simon & James R. Hagerty, Why Lenders Are Leery of Short 
Sales, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2008, at D1 (“[A] short sale might seem like a win-
win for everyone involved.”). 
 149. See Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 728, 
733 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011) (“[Debtors] cannot force lenders to accept [a] deed 
in lieu of foreclosure . . . .”); In re Burgueno, 451 B.R. 1, 4 n.9 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 
2011) (querying whether a quitclaim deed would require acceptance by the 
lender under Arizona common law); In re Cormier, 434 B.R. 222, 228 n.8 (Bankr. 
D. Mass. 2010) (noting that a bank has no duty to accept a deed in lieu of 
foreclosure); Harvest Homebuilders LLC v. Commonwealth Bank and Trust Co., 
310 S.W.3d 218, 221 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010) (finding no breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing when the lender did not consent to short-
sale by the borrower). 
 150. MORTGAGES, supra note 10, § 8.5 cmt. b (explaining that only 
foreclosure by a senior lien wipes out junior liens). 
 151. See Simon & Hagerty, supra note 148 (noting that a short sale also 
requires approval of the mortgage servicers who “must consider the interests of 
the investors who own the loans” in the secondary market). 
 152. See Powell, supra note 148 (“Short sales are also hindered when 
homeowners fail to forward the proper papers, have tax liens or cannot find a 
buyer.”). 
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to become responsible for taxes, selling costs, maintenance, and 
insurance on a property that may take months to resell in the 
current market.153  
Lenders are deterred from accepting the use of these 
foreclosure substitutes when nonacceptance entails immediate 
cost savings (avoiding having to find a new purchaser in a deed in 
lieu of foreclosure or quitclaim deed or having to perform due 
diligence on a short-sale transferee) along with the realization 
that the association is incentivized to keep up the property at its 
own expense.154 Thus, the current economic environment makes 
these alternatives to foreclosure useless to debtors with 
underwater mortgages. If courts dismiss the effects of 
§ 523(a)(16) under the assumption that debtors can use self-help 
to end accumulating assessments, then it is possible that 
Congress, in amending the Section, used the same faulty 
assumption. 
2. Section 523(a)(16)’s Ineffectiveness in Protecting Associations 
As evident from the legislative histories of the Section as 
originally enacted and amended, Congress clearly meant to 
protect associations.155 The combination of lender delay and lack 
of member equity has, however, rendered § 523(a)(16) of little 
value to associations. Debtors on tight budgets or ignorant of 
§ 523(a)(16) do not pay assessments, and associations must 
continue to maintain the property to avoid depressed home prices 
resulting from unmaintained, surrendered properties.156 Lenders, 
                                                                                                     
 153. See Frank A. St. Claire, Special Problems in Real Property Foreclosures, 
in REAL ESTATE FORECLOSURES 73, 92–93 (1992) (describing the flaws of deeds in 
lieu of foreclosure as a mechanism to divest ownership). 
 154. See In re Pigg, 453 B.R. at 732 n.5 (explaining the cost incurred by 
associations in maintaining property owned by nonpaying members to avoid 
depreciated values to surrounding properties). 
 155. See 140 CONG. REC. S4526 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (statement of Sen. 
Strom Thurmond) (“[A]ssociations may be unfairly burdened if members can file 
bankruptcy to discharge future assessments, but continue to reside on the 
property and receive benefits from the association.”); H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 68 
(2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 154 (attempting to expand the 
protections accorded to associations with BAPCPA’s amendment to 
§ 523(a)(16)). 
 156. See In re Colon, 465 B.R. 657, 664 (Bankr. D. Utah 2011) (recognizing 
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as the true beneficiaries of § 523(a)(16), are allowed to collect an 
inventory of surrendered homes, presumably to time the market 
for higher resale values, and avoid any associated inventory 
cost.157  
Further, lender delay is causing associations financial 
distress because they cannot get new dues-paying members into 
the units.158 Because liens for unpaid dues are subordinate in 
priority to lenders’ mortgages, and there is likely no equity to 
foreclose on a subordinate lien, the associations must choose 
between charging higher dues or allowing properties to go 
unmaintained.159 It is not practical for an association to foreclose 
on its lien for unpaid assessments because the association will 
have to (1) incur all foreclosure cost, and (2) find a buyer willing 
to take the overencumbered property, still subject to a lender’s 
                                                                                                     
the HOA’s “duties to maintain the neighborhood for the benefit of homeowners 
continue, yet it is saddled with an empty property that is not paying dues for 
such purposes”). 
 157. See Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 728, 
732 n.5 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011) (“The economics of the situation allow the 
Bank to sit idle and not foreclose as long as the debtor, not the Bank is liable for 
the HOA fees. . . . [T]he Bank receives the benefit of the HOA services such as 
landscaping improvements, common area maintenance, signage, and security.”). 
 158. See Trevor G. Pinkerton, Comment, Escaping the Death Spiral of Dues 
and Debt: Bankruptcy and Condominium Association Debtors, 26 EMORY BANKR. 
DEV. J. 125, 125 (2009) (suggesting Chapter 11 bankruptcy for associations in 
distress during this mortgage crisis). 
 159. See Liberty Cmty. Mgmt., Inc. v. Hall (In re Hall), 454 B.R. 230, 240 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011) (“If the assessments are [not collected], lawns may go 
unmown and pools may go uncleaned—all of which can lead to reduced property 
values for the individual units.”); Rachel Furman, Note & Comment, Collecting 
Unpaid Assessments: The Homeowner Association’s Dilemma When Foreclosure 
Is No Longer a Viable Option, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 751, 754–57 (2011) (noting that 
lender delay on an underwater mortgage means the association must continue 
to maintain a property with no fees being collected from the unit owner). Before 
the drop in home values, many HOAs were successfully able to use the threat of 
foreclosure to compel payment of delinquent HOA fees. See Furman, supra, at 
757. If the threat did not work, lenders would step in and foreclose rather than 
have a new, and possibly unqualified, owner assume the mortgage. See id. at 
758–59 (noting that if the HOA foreclosed and took the property to auction, the 
lender may be stuck with an unqualified high bidder). As prices have fallen and 
the market of potential buyers has shrunk, lenders may find it quite 
advantageous to sit idle and allow the association to auction the property to a 
new buyer who will assume the mortgage. Id. (noting that with the high cost of 
foreclosure, a lender is better off with the association initiating the foreclosure). 
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priority lien.160 Associations could potentially protect themselves 
from lenders’ inaction by including a clause for priority lien 
status in their declarations.161 However, this would inevitably 
diminish the marketability of the units because lenders would 
charge higher rates, or refuse to lend at all, in an attempt to 
hedge the risk of holding a subordinate lien on a property that 
has fallen in value.162 
Section 523(a)(16) attempted to cure a perceived inequity 
faced by associations when members use bankruptcy to discharge 
future assessments. However, the circumstances of decreased 
home values and lender delay have shifted these benefits to 
lenders. As a result, debtors’ fresh start is placed in the lenders’ 
unbridled discretion to foreclose.163 
                                                                                                     
 160. See Lawrence Roberts, Will HOA Lawsuits Compel Lenders to Foreclose 
on Shadow Inventory?, IRVINE HOUSING BLOG (June 16, 2010), 
http://www.irvinehousingblog.com/blog/comments/will-hoa-lawsuits-compel-lenders-
to-foreclose-on-shadow-inventory/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (noting that it is in 
the association’s best interest to get new dues-paying owners into surrendered 
units, but the risk of having to take title to the property at foreclosure auction 
because no buyer can be found far outweighs the burden of freeriding members) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 161. See Cypress on Sunland Homeowners Ass’n v. Orlandini, 257 P.3d 
1168, 1177 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2011) (interpreting Arizona’s code § 33-1807 as 
subordinating any HOA assessment lien to that of the first mortgage holder but 
noting that the association could have protected itself with the appropriate 
language in the declaration); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 33-1807 (2012). But see 
Thaler v. Household Fin. Corp., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) 
(holding that an HOA’s assessment lien filed after the deed of trust is 
subordinated even though the condominium covenants, conditions, and 
restrictions give priority to the HOA). 
 162. See Orlandini, 257 P.3d at 1177 (noting that the association likely 
chose not to protect itself with priority lien status so as to encourage cheaper 
financing for its owners). 
 163. See In re Pratola, 152 B.R. 874, 878 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1993) (“The fact 
that both the mortgagee-bank and the condominium association both refused to 
accept tender of a deed from the debtor should not operate against the debtor’s 
entitlement to a ‘fresh start’ which the Bankruptcy Code was meant to 
provide.”); see also Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 
728, 733 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011) (“If the lender never forecloses, that 
homeowner’s liability for the HOA fees continues in perpetuity.”). 
HOA FEES 1429 
3. Section 523(a)(16)’s Overinclusiveness 
Prior to 1994, courts following the prepetition contract theory 
would discharge all assessments coming due after filing.164 This 
gave incentive to abusive, bad faith freeriders, who would 
discharge future assessments, continue to inhabit their property 
by continuing to pay their mortgage, and receive all the benefits 
of community ownership without paying assessments. The 1994 
version of the statute adequately protected associations from 
these freeriders. Freeriders, who continued to inhabit the 
property and procure benefits from the association, remained 
liable for assessments coming due after filing.165  
BAPCPA’s amendments sought to expand the protections 
afforded to associations.166 The expansion, however, is 
overinclusive. In addition to preventing freeriders from partaking 
in the Code’s benefits, the Section engulfs honest, good faith 
debtors who are unable to discontinue their interests in 
overencumbered property.167 While the amendment could 
potentially lead to higher collection rates for associations, it 
pursues a new type of debtor, different from the egregious 
debtors, like drunk drivers, that § 523 has traditionally protected 
against.168 This nontraditional use of § 523 has left debtors at the 
mercy of lenders’ willingness to foreclose. If lenders do not timely 
foreclose, debtors will face collection efforts by their association, 
                                                                                                     
 164. See In re Rosteck, 899 F.2d 694, 698 (B.A.P. 7th Cir. 1990) (discharging 
all future assessments because debtors “had a debt for future condominium 
assessments when they filed their bankruptcy petition”). 
 165. See Reform Act § 309 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) 
(1994)) (current version at 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(16) (2010)) (discharging future 
assessments if the debtor vacated the premises and did not rent it out). 
 166. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 68 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
88, 154 (noting that the intention of BAPCPA’s amendment to § 523(a)(16) was 
an expansion to the protections accorded to associations). 
 167. See In re Pigg, 453 B.R. at 733 (noting that BAPCPA’s § 523(a)(16) 
effectively “deprives the debtor of a fresh start, and thwarts the goals of the 
entire Bankruptcy Code”). But see In re Raymond, 129 B.R. 354, 359 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 1991) (concluding that discharging assessments coming due after filing 
would give debtor a head start instead of a fresh start). 
 168. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(9) (2010) (preventing debtors from discharging 
debts associated with damages resulting from driving under the influence of 
drugs or alcohol). 
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preventing the reestablishment of credit.169 After the subsequent 
foreclosure, unpaid assessments may still be collected.170 
Alternatively, debtors could remain on the property at the cost of 
continuing to make mortgage payments on overencumbered 
property and being constrained as to where they can live and find 
work.  
In addition to the policy consideration of preventing bad faith 
debtors from partaking in the bankruptcy process, § 523 also 
seeks to protect certain worthy creditors from their debtors 
utilizing bankruptcy to the creditors’ detriment.171 Both 
unsecured taxing authorities and recipients of domestic support 
fall under this category.172 Associations, however, differ from 
these two protected creditors because associations maintain an in 
rem claim against the debtors’ property.173 Even localities with 
real property tax claims, secured by the property and coming due 
after filing, do not receive protection under § 523. Accordingly, 
absent the need for protection from bad faith debtors, 
associations do not seem to require additional protection from the 
Code. Rather, it seems like a strong lobbying group has created a 
preferred creditor.174  
IV. Possible Solutions  
This Part will provide three solutions to § 523(a)(16)’s death-
trap. The first is a proposal to amend § 523(a)(16) to a slight 
                                                                                                     
 169. See Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 728, 
733 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011) (“[Debtors] cannot truly be given a fresh start 
because HOA fees are still accumulating until a lender chooses to foreclose.”).  
 170. In re Ames, 447 B.R. 680, 684 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011) (allowing the 
association to pursue any unpaid assessments coming due between the 
member’s bankruptcy filing and the eventual foreclosure). 
 171. But see Howard, supra note 15, at 1057 (describing this policy as “fairly 
weak”). 
 172. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1) (2010) (excluding unsecured taxes from 
discharge); id. § 523(a)(5) (excluding domestic obligations from discharge). 
 173. See FREEDMAN & ALTER, supra note 22, at 151 (noting that upon a 
member’s bankruptcy discharge, “the association’s remedy for post-petition 
assessment amounts is to exercise the lien and foreclosure rights against the 
property”). 
 174. See In re Pigg, 453 B.R. at 733 (suggesting § 523(a)(16)’s expanded 
protections to associations is “the result of some special interest lobbying”). 
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modification of the 1994 version of the statute. The amendment 
would require associations to seek additional protection by lien 
priority through their declarations and state legislatures. 
Because of the death-trap § 523(a)(16) creates for debtors, courts 
have begun experimenting with ways to circumvent the Section’s 
harsh results. This Part will end with a critique of two methods 
courts have considered in getting around the section’s harsh 
results.  
A. Proposal to Amend § 523(a)(16) 
Any proposal to amend § 523(a)(16) needs to account for the 
factors that have created the inequities faced by debtors and 
associations. The proposal should apply to both Chapter 7 and 13 
debtors, and serve the goals of the Code in both rising and falling 
economic periods. It should be easy to administer, and add 
predictability to the marketplace, rather than give courts reason 
to sporadically circumvent the Section to avoid its inequitable 
results.175 It needs to limit incentives to lenders to delay 
foreclosure on surrendered property because foreclosure provides 
the best solution: assessment-paying buyers to associations and a 
fresh start to debtors. 
The 1994 version of § 523(a)(16), which based the 
dischargeability of accumulating assessments on the continued 
possession or use of the association’s services, codified an 
identical line of cases predating § 523(a)(16)’s enactment.176 In 
Chapter 13 cases, courts have continued to use this judge-created 
approach since § 523(a)(16)’s enactment.177 The approach is 
founded on “equitable grounds” because it provides protection 
                                                                                                     
 175. See id. at 736 (compelling foreclosure to avoid § 523(a)(16)’s harsh 
results). 
 176. See, e.g., In re Ryan, 100 B.R. 411, 417 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1989) 
(determining the dischargeability of assessments depends on whether the debtor 
vacated or remained on the property); In re Montoya, 95 B.R. 511, 513 (Bankr. 
S.D. Ohio 1988) (finding that postpetition assessments were discharged when 
debtor abandoned property before filing bankruptcy). 
 177. See Foster v. Double R Ranch Ass’n (In re Foster), 435 B.R. 650, 655 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010) (stating the issue of dischargeability as dependent on 
whether “debtor continued to reside on the property”); In re Colon, 465 B.R. 657, 
662–63 (Bankr. D. Utah 2011) (using the issue as stated in Foster (quoting In re 
Foster, 435 B.R. at 655)).  
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against freeriding debtors, while still providing vacating debtors 
with a fresh start as promised by the Code.178  
The problem with the 1994 statute, which was not fixed with 
the 2005 amendment, was that while it solved the problem of 
freeriding member-borrowers, it left open the potential for abuse 
by freeriding lenders. Lenders, with their priority lien status, are 
given a legislative grace period to delay foreclosure until a 
suitable time and avoid all maintenance and carrying costs in the 
interim.179 An amended, § 523(a)(16) should provide: 
(a) A discharge . . . does not discharge an individual debtor 
from any debt— 
. . . . 
(16) for a fee or assessment that becomes due and payable 
after the order for relief to a membership association with 
respect to the debtor’s interest in a unit that has condominium 
ownership, in a share of a cooperative corporation, or a lot in a 
homeowners association, but only if such fee or assessment is 
payable for a period during which-- 
(A) the debtor physically occupied a dwelling unit in the 
condominium or cooperative project; or 
(B) the debtor rented the dwelling unit to a tenant and 
received payments from the tenant for such period, but 
nothing in this paragraph shall except from discharge the debt 
of a debtor for a membership association fee or assessment for 
a period arising before entry of the order for relief in a pending 
or subsequent bankruptcy case; or 
(C) the debtor surrenders the unoccupied property to its secured 
lien holder, limited to a period of 90 days measured as of the 
date of filing. 
For this proposal to apply to Chapter 13 debtors, § 1328(a)(2) 
must be amended to include § 523(a)(16). The proposal modifies 
the 1994 amendment by including “homeowners association” and 
subpart C. Pursuant to proposed § 523(a)(16), debtors who 
                                                                                                     
 178. Eno v. Indian Country Campsites Recreation & Maint. Fund (In re 
Eno), 269 B.R. 319, 321–22 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2001); In re Ryan, 100 B.R. at 414 
(describing its approach as furthering “the Code’s ‘fresh start’ policy”). 
 179. In re Miller, 125 B.R. 441, 443 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1991) (noting that the 
benefits provided by the association accrue solely “to the mortgage holder” after 
the debtor has vacated the property). 
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continue to use their property for personal use or for generating 
rental income would continue to be responsible for assessments 
coming due after filing. Absent debtors would be responsible for 
assessments for a period of three months following their 
surrendering and vacating of their property, recognizing the 
required time needed for foreclosure. 
There may be no perfect balance between this three-party 
relationship of association, debtor, and lender. The proposal has 
its own flaws: First, lenders will likely use the three-month grace 
period to their full advantage, and not begin the foreclosure 
process until after the period expires. Second, the proposal will 
benefit debtors to the detriment of associations that are unable to 
collect from vacating members.180  
Note that BAPCPA’s § 523(a)(16) was intended to protect 
associations, but contributed to the opposite result. To combat 
these flaws and provide associations with ample protection, 
priority lien status needs to be given to associations. Drafting the 
declaration to give the lien for unpaid assessments priority over 
the mortgage would prompt foreclosure and payment of unpaid 
assessments.181 And although it would increase the cost of 
financing purchases, preventing some sales, it would also insure 
against the noncollection of assessments and the resulting 
property value declines.  
Each state provides a statutory hierarchy of lien priority.182 
Currently every state gives local real estate tax liens first priority 
over all other claims against the property.183 With collection rates 
of over 99%, the real estate tax system is “one of the most 
efficient tax collection systems in the United States.”184 If 
associations occupied a similar position, they could promptly 
foreclose upon a member’s default, ensuring payment of arrears 
                                                                                                     
 180. See Ricotta, supra note 109, at 187 (noting the increased burden on 
associations if they are unable to collect from debtors that vacated under the 
1994 amendment to § 523(a)(16)). 
 181. But see Thaler v. Household Fin. Corp., 95 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 781 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2000) (declining to recognize the subordination clause in the 
association’s declaration and giving the lender lien priority).  
 182. See, e.g., MD. CODE. ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-104 (West 1997) (providing 
the statutory hierarchy for liens against real property in Maryland). 
 183. See, e.g., VA. CODE. ANN. § 58.1-3340 (West 1950) (granting real estate 
tax liens seniority over all others filed against the property). 
 184. SCHMUDDE, supra note 10, § 11.03. 
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and avoiding freeriders. If associations were able to persuade 
Congress for protection in the federal Bankruptcy Code, I have no 
doubt they will be able to achieve similar results at the state 
level.185 
B. Judicial Solutions 
As an alternative or interim remedy to a legislative 
amendment, courts could provide relief to debtors that are the 
victims of lender delay. There are two conceivable ways a 
bankruptcy court can cause the lender to transfer title out of the 
borrower’s name.  
1. Section 105 Equitable Powers 
Section 105186 gives bankruptcy courts the power to fashion 
appropriate remedies “to carry out the provisions of [the 
Code].”187 Equitable powers are used when applying the Code 
strictly to the facts would create an inequitable result.188 
Recently, in Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP,189 the court 
used its § 105 equitable powers to prevent a debtor from “not 
truly be[ing] given a fresh start because HOA fees are still 
                                                                                                     
 185. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:8B-21(b) (1997) (granting lien priority 
status to associations over lenders). 
 186. See 11 U.S.C. § 105 (2010). 
 187. Id. “Federal Courts are courts in law and in equity, and a court of 
equity has traditionally had the power to fashion any remedy deemed necessary 
and appropriate to do justice in a particular case.” Pigg v. BAC Home Loans 
Servicing, LP (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 728, 734 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011) (quoting 
Carter Jones Lumber Co. v. Dixie Distrib. Co., 166 F.3d 840, 846 (6th Cir. 
1999)). 
 188. See EPSTEIN, supra note 5, § 3-22 (“[A court’s] authority [under] section 
105(a) is to use the powers of equity, consistent with the law’s purpose and 
policy, to fill gaps and to trim or mold statutes that apply imperfectly in the 
particular case because of peculiar circumstances.”). 
 189. See In re Pigg, 453 B.R. at 733 (providing equitable relief to a debtor 
who surrendered property but whose lender refused to foreclose on the 
property). In Pigg, the debtor owned a condominium that was destroyed in the 
Nashville floods of 2010. See id. at 730. The debtor surrendered and vacated the 
property, and the lender changed the locks on the property. See id. Debtor 
sought to compel its lender to either accept a deed in lieu of foreclosure or to sell 
the house in foreclosure sale to stop the accumulating HOA fees. Id.  
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accumulating [pursuant to § 523(a)(16)] until a lender chooses to 
foreclose.”190 The court forced the transfer of title out of the 
debtor’s name after the lender refused to take action.191 
Section 105 equitable powers, however, “may only be 
exercised in a manner consistent with the provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code.”192 Because the Code is meant to protect 
debtors and creditors alike, consideration must be given to both 
parties when a court uses its § 105 powers.193 Both the Pigg and 
the Arsenault courts considered the interest of all concerned 
parties in determining the appropriate use of their § 105 powers 
with regard to accumulating assessments.194 Thus, Arsenault and 
Pigg turn on the priority given to the Code’s conflicting goals, 
with the court in Pigg compelling foreclosure and the court in 
Arsenault declining to do so.195  
                                                                                                     
 190. Id. at 733. But see In re Barr, 457 B.R. 733, 738 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011) 
(making no mention of debtor’s inability to regain a fresh start with the 
accumulating assessments and rejecting any use of § 105 equitable powers). In 
Barr, the debtor filed a Chapter 7 petition two days after the building he lived in 
sustained flood damage. See id. at 734. The condominium association levied a 
special assessment against the debtor’s property after the debtor’s discharge. 
See id. at 735. The court “determine[d] that the debt is excepted from discharge 
under § 523(a)(16).” Id. at 738.  
 191. See In re Pigg, 453 B.R. at 736 (using 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) to permit the 
trustee to sell the property and distribute the proceeds to the borrower). Under 
§ 363(f)(3), a trustee may sell the encumbered property if the lienholder 
consents, which the court found implicit through the lender’s inaction to 
foreclose on the property. See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (2010); see also In re Pigg, 453 
B.R. at 736 (citing several cases that have found consent under § 363(f) through 
creditor’s inaction). 
 192. United States v. Sutton, 789 F.2d 1305, 1308 (5th Cir. 1986).  
 193. See Arsenault v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Arsenault), 456 
B.R. 627, 631 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2011) (noting the need to protect creditor rights 
when using the court’s equitable powers); Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, 
LP (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 728, 735 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011) (noting that any use 
of equitable power under § 105(a) is constrained by the provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code and respect to the rights of lienholders must be given). 
 194. See In re Arsenault, 456 B.R. at 631 (“Congress sought to strike a 
balance among competing interest of debtors, creditors, and the government.” 
(quoting Sutton, 786 F.2d at 1306)). The court determined that it was not the 
lender’s responsibility to relieve the borrower of all incidents of ownership 
simply because the debtor did not want the property anymore. See id. (citing 
Canning v. Beneficial Me., Inc. (In re Canning), 442 B.R. 165, 172 (Bankr. D. 
Me. 2011), aff’d 462 B.R. 258 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011)). 
 195. Compare id. (noting that debtor’s “fresh start is not the only goal of 
bankruptcy”), with In re Pigg, 453 B.R. at 734 (“Equity requires that the court 
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In addition to consideration being given to all concerned 
parties, § 105 cannot be used “to create substantive rights that 
would otherwise be unavailable under the Code.”196 Arsenault 
expressed concern with giving a debtor the substantive right to 
force foreclosure—a right that was not bargained for in the 
mortgage origination process.197 This argument has merit; these 
mortgages were made under the assumption that a lender may 
choose when to foreclose.198 If courts, at the discretion of 
unsatisfied borrowers, began forcing foreclosure sales, a new risk, 
in the form of unpredictability, would enter the market.  
Accordingly, § 105 is only a discretionary tool to be used in 
the most egregious circumstances. Mounting assessments on a 
debtor with an underwater mortgage seem inadequate to trigger 
its use. Absent the lender constructively taking possession of a 
debtor’s property or the property being damaged by a natural 
disaster, § 105 will likely not be available.199 
2. Violation of Automatic Stay or Discharge Injunction by 
Refusing to Foreclose or Release 
A discharge creates a permanent statutory injunction 
preventing any collection efforts by a creditor, regardless of the 
design.200 Similarly, the automatic stay prevents a creditor from 
                                                                                                     
prevent the debtor’s fresh start from being completely eradicated by this 
legislated wrong without a remedy.”).  
 196. In re Morristown & Erie R.R. Co., 885 F.2d 98, 100 (3d Cir. 1989). 
 197. See In re Arsenault, 456 B.R. at 630–31 (“[Section 105] does not 
authorize the bankruptcy courts to create substantive rights that are otherwise 
unavailable under applicable law, or constitute a roving commission to do 
equity.” (quoting Sutton, 786 F.2d at 1308)). 
 198. See SCHMUDDE, supra note 10, § 5.01 (explaining that lenders are not 
required to foreclose and many times they are anxious to avoid it). 
 199. Compare Arsenault v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Arsenault), 
456 B.R. 627, 630 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2011) (noting that “[t]here are no allegations 
that [lender] has taken possession of the property”), with Pigg v. BAC Home 
Loans Servicing, LP (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 728, 732 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011) 
(noting the fact that lender changed the locks and placed a notice on the door 
excluding everyone, including the borrower). 
 200. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2010) (providing that the discharge “operates 
as an injunction against” any process or act to recover “a personal liability of the 
debtor”). 
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pursuing any collection technique of stayed claims.201 Violations 
of the stay or discharge injunction can result in damages, 
including attorney fees and punitive damages.202 While 
associations may continue to collect after a debtor’s discharge, 
lenders are limited to their in rem rights (foreclosure) against the 
property.203 If a lender unreasonably delays foreclosure, allowing 
assessments to accumulate until a borrower-debtor is forced to 
reaffirm the discharged mortgage payments owed to the lender, 
the lender will have effectively made a collection effort.204 If 
debtors can prove violation, lenders may speed foreclosures to 
avoid penalties and costs.205  
In Pratt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,206 the court 
determined that a secured automobile lender’s refusal to 
repossess or release its lien on surrendered property “was 
objectively and improperly ‘coercive’ [under] the circumstances” 
                                                                                                     
 201. See id. § 362(a)(6) (forbidding “any act to collect, assess, or recover a 
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under 
this title”). 
 202. See id. § 362(k); see also id. § 524(i). 
 203. Compare id. § 523(a)(16) (excluding assessments coming due after filing 
from discharge), with id. § 524 (declining to apply discharge to secured claims 
against debtors’ real property); see also Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 
78, 85 (1991) (limiting lender’s claim to its in rem right against the debtor’s 
secured property). 
 204. But see In re Ames, 447 B.R. 680, 683–84 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011) 
(rejecting debtor’s argument that lender’s inaction constituted a violation of 
§ 362’s automatic stay). 
 205. See Pratt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Pratt), 462 F.3d 14, 19 
(1st Cir. 2006) (“In assessing violations of the automatic stay and the discharge 
injunction, the core issue is whether the creditor acted in such a way as to 
‘coerce’ or ‘harass’ the debtor improperly.”). 
 206. See id. at 20 (finding no obligation by the secured lender to accept 
surrendered property but concluding that secured creditor’s “refusal to release 
its valueless lien” on debtor’s automobile was a violation of the discharge). In 
Pratt, prior to filing bankruptcy, the debtor financed a vehicle through the 
creditor. See id. at 15. Debtor indicated that he wanted to surrender the 
property, but the creditor never repossessed the vehicle. See id. Upon the vehicle 
becoming inoperable ten years later and the lender still not taking action, 
debtors filed suit asking the court to find the lender in violation of the discharge 
injunction. Id. at 16. The court recognized that § 521(a)’s surrender option does 
not require a secured creditor to accept surrendered property. See id. at 18–19 
n.4 (“[A]s such a reading would be at odds with well-established law that a 
creditor’s decision whether to foreclose on and/or repossess collateral is purely 
voluntary and discretionary.”). 
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and, therefore, violated the discharge injunction.207 The court 
listed five factors it considered material in finding the lender’s 
inaction equated to objective coercion.208 Of specific importance 
was the fact that lender had not “repossess[ed] the ‘surrendered’ 
vehicle because it was of insufficient value” and it was cost-
prohibitive, “conditioned its release of the lien upon the [debtors’] 
agreement to repay the loan balance in full,” and that without the 
lender’s repossession or release of lien, the debtors would 
“retain[] indefinite possession of a worthless vehicle . . . together 
with all the attendant costs of possessing, maintaining, insuring, 
and/or garaging the vehicle.”209 
Debtors seeking to avoid accumulating association 
assessments and other carrying costs associated with 
surrendered property have relied on Pratt’s analysis in claiming 
that lenders’ refusal to foreclose equates to a violation of the 
automatic stay or discharge injunction. Their attempts, however, 
have been unsuccessful. The Arsenault court found that the 
debtor had not met the high standard of “improper coercion or 
harassment in violation of the automatic stay.”210 Debtor’s 
continued obligation to pay accumulating association 
assessments because of lender’s delay was not a coercive act in 
violation of the automatic stay.211 Dismissing accumulating real 
estate taxes, insurance premiums, and association assessments 
as “incidents of ownership,”212 the court in Canning v. Beneficial 
Maine, Inc.213 stressed the personal nature and lack of potential 
                                                                                                     
 207. Id. at 19. But see id. at 20 (noting “that a secured creditor invariably 
would [not] be in violation of the discharge injunction were it to insist upon its 
in rem rights under state law”). 
 208. Id. at 20. 
 209. Id.  
 210. Arsenault v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Arsenault), 456 B.R. 
627, 632 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2011). 
 211. Id. 
 212. See Canning v. Beneficial Me., Inc. (In re Canning), 442 B.R. 165, 172 
(Bankr. D. Me. 2011) (“Forces remained at work that could make their 
continued ownership of the real estate uncomfortable—forces like [accumulating 
association fees,] accruing real estate taxes and the desirability of maintaining 
liability insurance for the premises. But those forces are incidents of 
ownership.” (citing Foster v. Double R Ranch Assn. (In re Foster), 435 B.R. 650, 
653 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010))), aff’d 462 B.R. 258 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2011).  
 213. See id. at 170 (determining that lender’s “refusal to foreclose . . . 
immediately upon [debtor’s] post-discharge demand did not closely approach a 
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appreciation of the car surrendered in Pratt versus the potential 
for appreciation in real property.214 
The court in Pratt emphasized that the coercive use of state 
law could “impinge upon the important federal interest served by 
the discharge injunction, which is to ensure that debtors receive a 
fresh start.”215 The accumulating assessment cases declining to 
follow Pratt have not given similar weight to the Code’s 
guarantee of a fresh start.216 Although the Canning court did not 
find the lender in violation of the discharge injunction after 
refusing to foreclose, it is conceivable that a court, in an accruing 
assessment case, could find the factors satisfied. For example, if 
the facts of Pigg are applied to the Pratt test, it is reasonable to 
conclude that the lender was in violation of the discharge 
injunction—the value of the collateral was minute relative to the 
loans, lender had taken no action, and costs were accumulating 
as a result of debtor holding the surrendered property.217 In Pigg, 
however, the property had been significantly damaged by a 
natural disaster—a cause beyond that of the mortgage crisis, 
which has affected, to some extent, every homeowner with a 
mortgage.218 
                                                                                                     
violation” of the discharge injunction found in Pratt). In Canning, the debtors 
claimed that lender’s refusal to foreclose on property “frustrated their right to 
surrender their home and attempted to coerce them to answer personally for 
their discharged debt.” Id. at 171. Debtors argued that like the secured creditor 
in Pratt, Beneficial was not foreclosing because it was not cost-effective to do so. 
See id. The Canning court determined that there was no violation of the 
discharge injunction in lender’s refusal to foreclose on surrendered property. Id.  
 214. See id. at 172 (noting “the collateral’s worthlessness [in Pratt] and the 
fact that, unlike real estate, vehicles rarely appreciate in value over time” 
(quotation marks omitted)). 
 215. See Pratt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Pratt), 462 F.3d 14, 19 
(1st Cir. 2006).  
 216. See Arsenault v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (In re Arsenault), 456 
B.R. 627, 631 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2011) (noting “[d]ebtors’ fresh start is not the 
only interest addressed in the Bankruptcy Code”); see also In re Cormier, 434 
B.R. 222, 232 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2010) (determining lender’s decision to “not 
immediately accept a deed-in-lieu of foreclosure” was not in itself denying debtor 
a fresh start). 
 217. See Pigg v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (In re Pigg), 453 B.R. 728, 
732 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 2011) (noting the substantial loss of value due to 
flooding, accumulation of assessments, and lender’s decision not to foreclose 
because of the depressed real estate market and associated cost of foreclosure). 
 218. See id. at 730 (discussing the extent of the damage to debtor’s 
property). But see In re Warren, 457 B.R. 733, 735 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011) 
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V. Conclusion 
Any proposed protections granted to associations or debtors 
from lender delay may have unintended consequences. The 
proposed amendment to § 523(a)(16) will decrease assessment 
collection in the short-run and require increased dues among 
other members.219 This problem can be hedged over time with 
contractual protections and changes in lien priority at the state 
level. 
Any attempt to speed up foreclosures, either through judicial 
equitable powers or discharge injunction violations, must take 
into account the downsides of foreclosures. Increased foreclosure 
rates depress surrounding home values, increase crime rates, and 
harm local businesses.220 Use of equitable powers and penalties 
for discharge injunction and stay violations create uncertainty, 
and lenders will likely hedge this uncertainty with higher rates. 
Higher rates will make financing difficult for borrowers, causing 
them to rush to the rental market and drive up rental costs.221 
There is also a moral hazard concern if borrowers, upon filing 
bankruptcy, can ask bankruptcy courts to compel foreclosure on 
risky home investments.222 
On the other hand, the cost of a bankruptcy system on 
society includes a higher cost of credit and the potential for moral 
                                                                                                     
(providing no redress through equitable powers even when debtor’s property 
was located in a flooded building). 
 219. See Ricotta, supra note 109, at 187 (criticizing the 1994 version of 
§ 523(a)(16) because associations would have to charge higher assessments to 
dues-paying members to compensate for discharged assessments). 
 220. See Adam J. Levitin, Resolving the Foreclosure Crisis: Modification of 
Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 565, 569 (2009) (noting the negative 
effects of foreclosures on third parties such as families and local businesses, as 
well as the negative impacts on local housing and commercial real estate prices); 
see also id. at 570 (noting the potential for increased crime rates and erosion of 
the tax base). 
 221. Motoko Rich, Home Prices Are Down, but Rentals Are Rising, ECONOMIX 
(Sept. 15, 2011, 5:26 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/15/home-
prices-are-down-but-rentals-are-rising/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (on file with 
the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 222. See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 
HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1402 (1985) (defining moral hazard as “a situation in which 
individuals systematically—and rationally—underestimate the real costs of 
engaging in a risky activity because those costs are borne by someone else”). 
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hazard.223 The economy cannot recover without a healthy 
consumer base free of prior poor economic decisions. The Code’s 
fresh start can provide that base. 
  
                                                                                                     
 223. See id. at 1427–28 (increasing the availability of a fresh start would 
increase interest rates and lead to “an inevitable and substantial moral hazard 
problem”); Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. 
REV. 953, 983 (1981) (“Those debtors who pay their debts bear the assumed 
increased credit cost. Nonpaying debtors, to whose defaults the increased cost of 
credit is attributable, do not fully share in that increased cost.”). But see 
Jackson, supra note 222, at 1402 (noting that bankruptcy “shifts the costs of 
overextending credit from debtors to creditors, who are in a better position to 
minimize those costs”); Howard, supra note 15, at 1066 (proposing that 
bankruptcy discharge does not increase the cost of credit because consumer 
credit is not perfectly elastic). 
